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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE EFFECTS OF COGNITIVE BIAS, EXAMINER EXPERIENCE, AND 
STIMULUS MATERIAL ON FORENSIC EVIDENCE ANALYSIS 
by 
Michelle M. Pena 
Florida International University, 2019 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Nadja Schreiber Compo, Major Professor 
Forensic examiners have come under scrutiny in recent years because of high 
profile exoneration cases that have highlighted the negative impact contextual bias can 
have on investigations including forensic evidence analyses. This has led to several 
proposed solutions to reduce the effects of bias including blind testing and redacting task-
irrelevant information. However, practitioners have not been receptive to such 
recommendations because of the limitations found in past research, such as the use of 
untrained undergraduate students to examine complex pieces of forensic evidence (e.g., 
fingerprints). The current study thus had the following aims: (a) examine the effect of 
contextual bias on examiners’ evaluation of forensic evidence by varying the amount of 
pre-comparison information available to participants, (b) compare novice and expert 
examiners’ performance when conducting forensic analyses and their vulnerabilities to 
contextual bias, and (c) investigate the effect of contextual bias on examiners’ evaluation 
of different types of forensic evidence. Expert forensic examiners and novice 
undergraduate students were recruited and provided with a lab analysis request form that 
either contained all case summary details about a mock crime, no case summary details 
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about the crime (i.e., blind testing) or had task-irrelevant case summary details redacted. 
Participants were asked to compare matching and non-matching fingerprint and footwear 
impression evidence. Results suggest no effect of blinding examiners from case 
information or redacting task-irrelevant information on examiners’ decisions. Findings 
also suggest that both examiner experience and the type of forensic evidence analyzed 
can have a significant effect on examiners’ judgments. Expert examiners were 
significantly more accurate than novices. However, expert examiners were only 
significantly more accurate and better able to discriminate between matching and non-
matching pairs of evidence when analyzing fingerprint evidence and not footwear 
impression evidence. These findings suggest caution when using forensic stimuli with 
novice samples to investigate cognitive bias in forensic examination. Finally, the present 
study suggest that the proposed blinding and redaction procedures require additional 
research including expert examiners and a spectrum of forensic stimulus material to yield 
measurable effects of cognitive bias.  
 
 
vii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER                                            PAGE 
Design  ...................................................................................................................41 
Participants  ............................................................................................................41 
Materials  ...............................................................................................................41 
Procedure ...............................................................................................................46 
Coding of Outcome Variables  ..............................................................................47 
 
V. PILOT STUDY TWO RESULTS  ........................................................................47 
Match Judgments  ..................................................................................................47 
Non-Match Judgments  ..........................................................................................48 
Inconclusive Judgments  ........................................................................................48 
Overall Accuracy Rate  ..........................................................................................48 
 
VI. MAIN STUDY METHODS  .................................................................................49 
Design  ...................................................................................................................49 
Participants  ............................................................................................................49 
Materials  ...............................................................................................................50 
Procedure ...............................................................................................................57 
Coding of Outcome Variables  ..............................................................................59 
 
VII. MAIN STUDY RESULTS  ...................................................................................61 
Time 1 Judgments  .................................................................................................61 
I. INTRODUCTION  ..................................................................................................1 
Cognitive Bias  .........................................................................................................2 
Cognitive Bias in Legal Contexts ............................................................................5 
Cognitive Bias in Forensic Contexts .......................................................................7 
Dangers of Cognitive Bias in Forensic Sciences  ..................................................12 
Proposed Solutions ................................................................................................13 
Practitioners’ Concerns  .........................................................................................21 
Present Study  ........................................................................................................27 
 
II. PILOT STUDY ONE METHODS  .......................................................................34 
Participants  ............................................................................................................34 
Materials  ...............................................................................................................35 
Procedure  ..............................................................................................................37 
 
III. PILOT STUDY ONE RESULTS  .........................................................................38 
Match Fingerprint Judgments  ...............................................................................39 
Non-Match Fingerprint Judgments  .......................................................................39 
Selection of Match and Non-Match Fingerprint Pairs for Pilot Study Two  .........40 
 
IV. PILOT STUDY TWO METHODS  ......................................................................41 
viii 
 
CHAPTER                                           PAGE 
Signal Detection Measures  ...................................................................................67 
Confidence Ratings  ...............................................................................................69 
Time 2 Judgments  .................................................................................................71 
Perceptions Questionnaire  ................................................................................... 72 
 
VIII. DISCUSSION  .......................................................................................................74 
Contextual Information  .........................................................................................74 
Examiner Experience  ............................................................................................78 
Stimulus Material ...................................................................................................81 
Testing Linear Sequential Unmasking Procedures  ...............................................82 
Limitations and Future Directions  ........................................................................83 
Implications and Conclusions ................................................................................85 
 
TABLES  ...........................................................................................................................88 
 
FIGURES  ........................................................................................................................104 
 
LIST OF REFERENCES  ................................................................................................110 
 
APPENDICES  ................................................................................................................117 
 
VITA ................................................................................................................................132 
 
ix 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE                                                    PAGE 
1. Ordindal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor 
Variables and Likelihood of Making a Correct Fingerprint ID  .................................... 88 
 
2. Time 1 Judgments by Examiner Experience  ............................................................ 89 
 
3. Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor  
Variables on Likelihood of Making a Correct Footwear Impression ID  ...................... 90 
 
4. Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor  
Variables on Likelihood of Making an Incorrect Fingerprint Exclusion  ..................... 91 
 
5. Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor  
Variables on Likelihood of Making an Incorrect Footwear Impression Exclusion  ..... 92 
 
6. Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor  
Variables on Likelihood of Making a Correct Fingerprint Exclusion  .......................... 93 
 
7. Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor  
Variables on Likelihood of Making a Correct Footwear Impression Exclusion  .......... 94 
 
8. Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor  
Variables on Likelihood of Making a False Fingerprint ID .......................................... 95 
 
9. Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor  
Variables on Likelihood of Making a False Footwear Impression ID  ......................... 96 
 
10. Mixed ANOVA Analysis Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on  
Total Number of Inconclusive Judgments Made  .......................................................... 97 
 
11. Mixed ANOVA Analysis Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on  
Accuracy Rate  ............................................................................................................... 98 
 
12. Mixed ANOVA Analysis Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on 
Discrimination Accuracy  .............................................................................................. 99 
 
13. Mixed ANOVA Analysis Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on  
Response Bias  ............................................................................................................. 100 
 
 
x 
 
TABLE                                                    PAGE 
14. Mixed ANOVA Analysis Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on  
Confidence Ratings   .................................................................................................... 101 
 
15.  Confidence and Accuracy Bivariate Correlation by LAR and Experience  
Condition  .................................................................................................................... 102 
 
16. Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Contextual 
Information and Examiner Experience on Likelihood of Reviewing Time 1 
Judgments .................................................................................................................... 103 
 
 
 
xi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE                                                   PAGE 
1. Student Match Fingerprint Judgements  .................................................................. 104 
 
2. Student Non-Match Fingerprint Judgements  .......................................................... 105 
 
3. Average Number of Inconclusive Judgments by Examiner Experience and  
Stimulus Material  ........................................................................................................ 106 
 
4. Average Accuracy Rate by Examiner Experience and Evidence Material  ............. 107 
 
5. Average Discrimination Accuracy by Examiner Experience and Evidence  
Material  ....................................................................................................................... 108 
 
6. Average Confidence Ratings by Examiner Experience and Evidence Material  ..... 109 
  
 
1 
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Forensic sciences, including DNA and fingerprint analyses, were once believed to 
be error-free and consist of objective and purely scientific procedures, thus being 
regularly admitted as evidence at trial (Mnookin et al., 2011). Unfortunately, various 
high-profile cases, such as that of Brandon Mayfield (i.e., Madrid Bomber case), have 
brought forensic sciences under scrutiny in recent years as they highlight the subjective 
nature of such analyses and the subsequent consequences of human error. Along with 
these high-profile cases, analyses of hundreds of cases by the Innocence Project suggest 
that a large number of DNA exonerations are due, at least in part, to improper analysis or 
use of forensic evidence, casting doubt on the reliability of forensic sciences (Innocence 
Project, 2017).  
In recent years, researchers have begun to explore the potential factors that may 
lead forensic examiners to make such consequential errors. Specifically, a significant 
amount of research has examined how cognitive biases can affect the analysis of forensic 
evidence including DNA samples, fingerprints, handwriting samples, and footwear 
impressions (Dror & Hampikian, 2011; Dror, Peron, Hind, & Charlton, 2005; Kerstholt, 
Paashuis & Sjerps, 2007; Kukucka & Kassin, 2014). Much of this research suggests that 
having contextual information indicating that two forensic evidence samples came from 
the same person (e.g., suspect confessed to the crime) can increase the likelihood that an 
examiner will arrive at the same conclusion (e.g., fingerprint found at the crime scene 
matches suspect’s fingerprint), regardless of whether or not the samples did originate 
from the same person (Dror, Charlton, & Peron, 2006; Kukucka & Kassin, 2014). 
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Together, wrongful conviction cases and research on the effect of cognitive bias 
on forensic evidence analyses have led to the development of various solutions aimed at 
reducing these negative effects of bias. Some of these recommendations include 
implementing blind testing, using evidence lineups, and hiring case managers to redact 
any task-irrelevant information from lab analysis request forms (LARs) – a method often 
suggested as part of the linear sequential unmasking procedure (Edmond et al., 2016; 
Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 2013; Krane et al., 2008; Mattijssen, Kerkoff, Berger, Dror & 
Stoel, 2016; Saks, Risinger, Rosenthal, & Thompson, 2003). However, some of the 
recommendations put forth by researchers, such as using the linear sequential unmasking 
procedure, which are believed to reduce bias, have not been experimentally tested in 
forensic contexts.  
In addition, practitioners are often hesitant to incorporate recommendations that 
stem from research testing inexperienced examiners (often undergraduate students) who 
have no training in analyzing complex forensic evidence such as fingerprints. The present 
study thus aims to address the gap in the literature and the concerns voiced by forensic 
examiners (e.g., Butt, 2013) by directly comparing the use of blind versus redaction 
procedures on the analysis of different types of forensic evidence (i.e., fingerprints and 
footwear impressions) and the role examiner experience plays in explaining the 
relationship between cognitive bias and examiners’ judgments.  
Cognitive Bias 
 Social and cognitive scientists often use the term cognitive bias to describe a 
variety of different biases in human cognition and behavior. For instance, confirmation 
bias, contextual bias, expectancy effects, observer effects, tunnel vision, and belief 
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perseverance are often used interchangeably within the literature. Although the exact 
definitions for each of these terms vary to some degree, they all describe a variation of 
cognitive bias. In its broadest sense, cognitive bias describes how individuals’ prior 
beliefs and preconceptions can bias their subsequent interpretation of information in the 
direction of those expectations (Kassin et al., 2013; Nickerson, 1998; Rosenthal, 1994; 
Rosenthal & Fode, 1963). Cognitive biases are processes that occur automatically 
without the individuals’ awareness (Kunda, 1990). As such, individuals are not 
purposefully seeking out information or behaving in ways that support their prior beliefs 
nor are they deliberately choosing to ignore information that does not fit with their 
hypothesis (Ask & Granhag, 2005; Nickerson, 1998).  
Although cognitive bias occurs without conscious awareness, years of research 
have consistently shown that individuals’ expectations can produce dramatic behavioral 
consequences. For example, in one of the first studies examining bias, conducted by 
Rosenthal and Rubin (1978), grade-school teachers were arbitrarily told that some of 
their students had scored above average on an intelligence test and were thus expected to 
show a significant growth intellectually. Results demonstrated that students who were 
expected to produce this greater intellectual growth did in fact do so compared to those 
students who were not designated “high-scoring.” Similarly, Snyder and Swann (1978) 
examined how individuals’ prior beliefs about another individual could affect how they 
behaved and interacted with the other individual. The researchers led participants to 
believe that they would be interviewing a person who was either an extrovert or an 
introvert. Results revealed that interviewers selected questions and elicited responses that 
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were consistent with their expectations regarding the interviewee’s personality. The 
pattern of results was true regardless of whether interviewers’ expectations were correct.  
Cognitive bias has not only been shown to affect individuals’ overt behaviors, but 
also their perceptions of presented stimuli. For example, one of the classic studies 
conducted by Brunner and Potter (1964) shows how creating an initial hypothesis 
regarding ambiguous material affects how one perceives the same material as it becomes 
less ambiguous. Specifically, they presented participants with images of objects that were 
initially out of focus and were then shown images of these same objects as they were 
slowly brought into focus. They found that individuals’ initial beliefs of what they 
believed the object was in the first blurred image interfered with its recognition later on, 
when the same image became less blurry.  
In another study conducted by Bressan and Dan Martello (2002), participants 
were asked to rate the similarity between two faces and were told either a truthful or 
deceitful statement regarding the degree to which the two faces were related. Participants 
who had been told that the two faces were related rated the faces as more similar than 
participants who had been led to believe that the faces were unrelated regardless of 
whether the faces were truly related or not. In other words, what participants were told 
and thus their prior beliefs about the relatedness of the faces was a stronger predictor of 
how similar they rated the faces than the actual relatedness of the faces. Both of these 
studies demonstrate how cognitive biases, which are often considered to be mental 
shortcuts that ultimately simplify human decision making, can lead to errors in how one 
perceives subsequent stimuli and thus decisions made regarding such stimuli. 
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Cognitive Bias in Legal Contexts 
Research on cognitive bias has expanded beyond basic research lab paradigms 
into applied legal contexts, with similar results (Cantlon, Payne, & Erbaugh, 1996; Hasel 
& Kassin, 2009; Kassin, Goldstein, & Savitsky, 2003). Specifically, researchers have 
examined the effects of cognitive bias in witness and suspect interviewing contexts as 
well as within lineup procedures and eyewitness identifications. Regardless of the legal 
context in which cognitive bias has been examined, researchers continue to find support 
for its effect on human behavior and decision-making. For example, Kassin, Goldstein 
and Savitsky (2003), investigated how manipulating interrogators’ a priori expectations 
of a suspect’s guilt affected the types of questions interrogators asked and the different 
tactics used when interviewing the suspect. Specifically, interrogators were led to believe 
that the person they would be interviewing was either likely to be guilty or likely to be 
innocent and were informed that either 80% of the suspects in the study committed the 
crime (guilty expectation condition) or that only 20% committed the crime (innocent 
expectation condition). Results suggested that pre-interview expectations of guilt led to 
changes in an interrogator’s behavior such that those in the guilty expectation condition 
used more guilt-presumptive questions and interrogation tactics (e.g., promises of 
leniency, presentation of false evidence) than participants in the innocent expectation 
condition.  
Other studies examining the effect of pre-interview information have also found 
an effect on witness recall and victim disclosures (Cantlon et al., 1996; Rivard, Pena, & 
Schreiber Compo, 2015). For example, Rivard and colleagues (2015) conducted a study 
examining the effect of cognitive bias in adult witness interviewing contexts. Student-
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interviewers were provided either with correct, incorrect, or no information (i.e., blind 
interviewers) about a crime prior to interviewing student-witnesses who had watched said 
mock-crime. They found that witnesses recalled more correct details when interviewed 
by blind interviewers than by correctly informed interviewers. Taken together, findings 
across different legal interviewing contexts suggest that having pre-interview information 
may yield behavior that is detrimental to interviewers’ questioning strategies and the 
quality and quantity of information elicited from witnesses.  
 Within the eyewitness literature, there is also evidence to suggest that having 
information regarding the suspect’s guilt can affect eyewitness identification decisions. 
Hasel and Kassin (2009) exposed participants to a staged theft and a week later asked 
them to make an identification from a lineup that did not include the perpetrator. 
Participants were then told that a certain lineup member had confessed to the crime 
before being provided with the opportunity to change their original identification 
decision. They found that more than half of the participants who had selected a lineup 
member, but were later informed that it had been a different lineup member who 
confessed to the crime, changed their initial identification. In fact, 50% of those 
participants who changed their initial identification, selected the lineup member who 
allegedly confessed. Here too, research suggests that having prior beliefs about an 
individuals’ guilt can have direct consequences on a witness’ decision-making process as 
well as their perceptions of information presented to them.  
 Relatedly, other studies examining the effects of cognitive bias in eyewitness 
identification contexts have found that having information regarding a suspect’s location 
in the lineup can affect lineup administrators’ verbal and nonverbal behaviors 
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(Greathouse & Kovera, 2009). That is, administrators who are aware of the suspect’s 
location in a lineup may inadvertently leak cues of the specific location to the witness, 
which in turn can influence eyewitness decisions (Greathouse & Kovera, 2009; Haw & 
Fisher, 2004). It has therefore been recommended that lineups be administered in a 
double-blind fashion, with the lineup administrator “blind” to who the suspect is (IACP, 
2010). Overall, findings across various legal contexts mirror those found in initial studies 
examining the effects of cognitive bias, such that individuals’ expectations can affect 
how they behave and interpret subsequent information.  
Cognitive Bias in Forensic Contexts 
More recently research on cognitive bias has been extended to the domain of 
forensic sciences. As a result of high-profile cases highlighting the negative 
consequences of cognitive bias on forensic examiners’ decision-making, research has 
more directly examined the intricacies of how and when cognitive bias can affect the 
analysis of forensic evidence. Similar to past research on the effects of cognitive bias in 
other legal contexts (e.g., suspect interviewing, eyewitness identifications), research in 
the forensic domain suggests that individuals assessing forensic evidence are not immune 
to the effects of cognitive bias (Dror & Cole, 2010; Dror & Rosenthal, 2008). Kassin, 
Dror, and Kukucka (2013) coined the term forensic confirmation bias to describe “the 
class of effect through which an individual’s preexisting beliefs, expectations, motives, 
and situation context influence the collection, perception, and interpretation of evidence 
during the course of a criminal case” (p. 45). Similarly, the term contextual bias is often 
used in research examining the effects of bias in forensic sciences to refer to the specific 
effect of having extraneous information about the case (e.g., suspect’s ethnicity, 
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additional incriminating evidence) on examiners’ evaluations of forensic evidence 
(Edmond, Tangen, Searston, & Dror, 2015; Lange, Thomas, Dana, & Dawes, 2011).  
Research has examined the effect of contextual bias across a number of forensic 
domains including fingerprints, handwriting samples, shoeprints, bullets, auditory 
samples, and polygraph results (Dror et al., 2005; Elaad, Ginton, & Shakhar, 1994; 
Kerstholt, Paashuis, & Sjerps, 2007; Kerstholt et al., 2010; Kukucka & Kassin, 2014; 
Lange et al., 2011). Even DNA testing, which is often considered to be the “gold-
standard” of forensic evidence, has been demonstrated to fall prey to cognitive bias (Dror 
& Hampikian, 2011; Lynch, 2003), as all forensic domains require, to some extent, an 
individual’s subjective opinion to determine whether two pieces of evidence are similar 
enough to be considered a match regardless of the type of stimulus material.  
Taken together, findings across domains suggest that individuals’ decisions 
regarding the extent to which two stimuli/pieces of evidence derive from the same source 
(i.e., are matches) can be influenced by outside information about the crime, the suspect, 
or other available evidence. Research has also begun to expand beyond simply examining 
what type of contextual information can bias examiners’ analyses by investigating what 
specific moderating factors, if any, can influence the strength of the cognitive bias effect. 
For example, Dror and colleagues (2005) conducted a study examining the effects of 
emotional contextual case information and stimuli ambiguity on examiners’ interpretation 
of fingerprint evidence. Students were presented with numerous pairs of fingerprints that 
varied in level of ambiguity (i.e., ambiguous versus unambiguous). Before deciding 
whether each pair of prints were matches or non-matches, participants were presented 
with background information and photographs of the crime (i.e., contextual information). 
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The background information for each pair of prints varied in the emotional state it 
invoked; participants were provided with less serious, low-in-emotion background 
information about the crime (e.g., a bicycle theft) or with serious, high-in-emotion 
background information (e.g., a murder). Participants were also provided with crime 
scene pictures consistent with their condition; the low emotional state participants viewed 
pictures of the stolen items whereas those in the high emotional state condition were 
presented with pictures of victims who had been badly hurt or killed. They found that 
participants in the high emotional state condition were more likely to state that two 
fingerprints were a match (regardless of whether or not they were indeed a match) 
compared to those in the low emotional state. However, the effect was only found for 
participants who were given ambiguous fingerprints and not for those who were given 
clear fingerprints. This suggests that although cognitive bias may be present, other 
variables such as evidence ambiguity, can influence the relationship between contextual 
bias and examiner accuracy.  
Similarly, Kukucka and Kassin (2014) conducted a study to examine whether the 
similarity between two pieces of evidence could influence the degree to which having 
contextual information about a suspect could affect examiners’ decisions about the 
evidence. Participants were presented with a case in which an individual had robbed a 
bank and had been brought in for questioning. They then provided participants with 
evidence consisting of a handwritten note the perpetrator had given the bank teller 
demanding the money and a Miranda waiver the suspect in custody had signed. Before 
participants were asked to compare the two handwriting samples and decide whether they 
were a match or a non-match, participants were presented with information regarding the 
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innocence of the suspect. While some participants were told that the suspect had 
confessed during a prior interview, other participants were told that the suspect had 
maintained his innocence throughout the entire interview. The similarity between the two 
handwriting samples was also manipulated; samples were either categorized as very 
similar or not similar to one another. The effect of bias was hypothesized to have a 
stronger impact when participants were presented with a pair of highly similar non-
matching handwriting samples (a more difficult comparison) compared to less similar 
non-matching handwriting samples. Although results suggested an effect of cognitive 
bias, such that participants who had been told the suspect confessed were more likely to 
incorrectly judge the non-matching handwriting samples as matching, handwriting 
similarity did not moderate the effect cognitive bias had on participants’ analyses of the 
handwriting samples. The lack of the moderating effect suggests that regardless of 
whether it was a “clear” non-match decision (i.e., handwriting samples were less similar 
to one another) or not, participants were just as likely to erroneously state the samples 
were a match, which differs from Dror and colleagues’ (2005) findings where stimulus 
ambiguity did have a moderating effect on examiners’ judgments.  
It is also important to note that while some studies find an effect of cognitive bias 
on forensic analyses, others fail to demonstrate the effect at all (Dror & Cole, 2010; 
Kerstholt et al., 2007; Kerstholt et al., 2010). For example, Kerstholt and colleagues 
(2007) examined the effects of expectation and evidence complexity on trained police 
officers’ footwear impression examinations. Participants were presented with either 
neutral or guilt-presumptive information regarding the background of the case before 
being presented with four footwear impressions, two of which were simple and two of 
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which were considered complex. Kerstholt and colleagues (2007) found no main effect of 
expectation such that the guilt-presumptive information about the suspect given to 
participants did not alter how much evidentiary value was assigned to each footwear 
impression. These findings are in direct contrast to prior research suggesting that case 
details can affect individuals’ judgment and perception of evidence (Dror et al., 2005).  
Differences in results across studies may be caused by differences in outcome 
measures, cognitive bias manipulations, study procedures, and participant samples used. 
For example, while some studies may provide participants with both matching and non-
matching pieces of evidence, others may simply present non-matching prints or 
matching-prints. The problem lies in that one study may only measure the likelihood of 
participants making incorrect “match” decisions, while another study may only measure 
the likelihood of making incorrect “non-match” decisions; two different decisions, which 
arguably use different decision-making criterion. Similarly, some studies may ask 
participants to make a match/non-match judgment while others may simply ask them to 
rate how valuable the piece of evidence is. Again, differences in outcome measures make 
it difficult to pinpoint under what circumstances cognitive bias may be particularly 
harmful to individuals’ analyses of forensic evidence. In addition, a common limitation 
found in past research examining the effect of cognitive bias on forensic analyses is the 
lack of information provided regarding the methods used to categorize their stimuli as 
similar/not similar, ambiguous/unambiguous, or complex/non-complex. Without such 
information on how and if evidence materials were piloted, it is almost impossible to 
compare the effects of such moderating factors, likely further accounting for differences 
across studies.  
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Dangers of Cognitive Bias in Forensic Sciences 
Despite these inconsistencies and a lack of empirical research disentangling 
possible reasons for them, researchers generally agree that the potential dangers of 
cognitive bias in forensic sciences need to be addressed, and have proposed reforms 
(Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 2013; National Academy of Sciences, 2009). One of the first 
calls for reform was made by the National Academy of Science, which published a report 
critiquing various forensic disciplines (e.g., firearms, handwriting, fingerprints) for their 
lack of standardization and the risk of contextual bias affecting analyses (National 
Academy of Sciences, 2009). The report strongly urged the discipline of forensic science 
to work together with cognitive psychologists to address the issues related to cognitive 
bias in the forensic science disciplines.  
Many researchers have also argued that the dangers of cognitive bias go beyond 
simply affecting forensic examiners in the lab and have the potential to spill over to other 
pieces of evidence and other stages of the investigation, thus creating a bias snowball 
effect (Charman, Kavetski, & Mueller, 2017; Dror, Morgan, Rando, & Nakhaeizadeh, 
2017). The bias snowball effect explains how the effect of bias can increase as additional 
pieces of irrelevant information from different sources are integrated, influencing one 
another. For example, a forensic examiner may be influenced by information regarding a 
suspect’s confession, which in turn affects how the examiner perceives a pair of 
fingerprints, which can then subsequently affect an eyewitness’ identification if they are 
made aware of the confession information. Thus, these “independent” pieces of evidence 
are no longer independent of one another and instead lead to “corroboration inflation” 
(Kassin, 2012), where an illusion of false support is produced.  
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Furthermore, a theoretical model has been proposed to better explain how 
cognitive bias affects the integration of evidence and how it affects the investigation of a 
crime as a whole, making it especially problematic (Charman, 2013). The cognitive 
coherence approach argues that research must move beyond simply understanding how 
one piece of evidence (e.g., confession) influences the evaluation of another piece of 
evidence (e.g., eyewitness identification), and highlights how the evaluation of evidence 
affects greater evolving conclusions that are formed by the investigative team (i.e., 
whether the suspect is guilty or not guilty). It also emphasizes the bidirectionality of these 
effects such that the evaluation of one piece of evidence affects the emerging conclusion, 
and this conclusion in turn can affect the evaluation of other evidence (Charman, 2013; 
Dror et al., 2017).  
Overall, a significant amount of research has focused on factors that can bias 
forensic examiners such as knowing that the suspect confessed (Kukucka & Kassin, 
2014), that the evidence is part of a high-profile case (Schiffer & Champod, 2007) or 
knowing the conclusions of a previous examiner (Dror, Charlton, & Peron, 2006). 
Regardless of the context, findings have often led researchers to warn practitioners 
against the potential dangers that stem from the cross-contamination of evidentiary 
information when examiners are informed of other, forensic or non-forensic pieces of 
information.  
Proposed Solutions 
Previous work examining the possible factors that can make examiners 
particularly susceptible to bias has led researchers to propose and advocate for procedural 
changes in forensic laboratories that minimize the effects of cognitive bias (see Kassin, 
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Dror, Kukucka, 2013). For example, researchers have proposed using the following, (1) 
blind testing, (2) evidence lineups, and (3) contextual information management 
procedures (Cole, 2013; Edmond et al., 2016; Kassin et al., 2013; Mattijssen et al., 2016; 
Risinger, Saks, Thompson, & Rosenthal, 2002; Saks et al., 2003; Thompson, 2011).  
Blind testing. Blind testing is one of the most recommended and used methods in 
both the biomedical field (Kaptchuk, 1998) and in psychological research (Rosenthal, 
1966), rendering both scientists and researchers unaware of the conditions participants 
have been assigned to and of study hypotheses, which both have the potential to provide 
biasing information. Similarly, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology (2016) has noted the importance of blinding forensic examiners from 
extraneous and potentially biasing information. In addition to the recent body of work on 
cognitive bias in forensic sciences, these recommendations are largely influenced by the 
years of research examining the effect of cognitive bias on individuals’ decision-making 
(Nickerson, 1998; Rosenthal & Fode, 1963).  
Unfortunately, there is a large discrepancy between how strongly researchers 
advocate for the use of blind testing in forensic sciences and the amount of research that 
has actually tested this method in forensically-relevant domains. That is, only a few 
studies have directly examined how keeping examiners blind to extraneous information 
about a case influences their decisions. The majority of studies manipulate participants’ 
expectations regarding a piece of evidence by presenting some participants with 
incriminating evidence (e.g., suspect confessed) or potentially biasing case information 
(e.g., high profile case) and other participants with “neutral” information (e.g., suspect 
maintained his innocence throughout entire interview, low-profile case; Kukucka & 
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Kassin, 2014; Schiffer & Champod, 2007). However, presenting participants with 
“neutral” information is not a true test of blind testing, which would require participants 
to receive no information (or at least no extraneous information) about the case.  
Those few studies that have directly tested a bona fide blind testing manipulation 
(i.e., examiners were not provided with any information about the case and were solely 
given pieces of evidence to analyze) have yielded mixed results regarding a possible 
advantage of using blind testing (Lange et al., 2011; Langenburg, Champod, & 
Wertheim, 2009). For example, Langenburg and colleagues (2009) assigned participants 
who were either experts or trained students who had taken a forensic fingerprint analyses 
training course to either a high bias, low bias, or no context condition. Participants in the 
no context condition were not provided with any information about the case and were 
simply asked to make a judgment regarding the fingerprints. Participants in the high and 
low bias group were provided with information regarding a prior examiner’s decision. 
Participants in the no context condition made a similar number of errors when judging the 
fingerprints compared to those in the high and low bias groups. However, in a different 
study conducted by Lange and colleagues (2011), a different finding emerged. 
Participants listened to and transcribed degraded pieces of audio and were either told that 
the audio they would be listening to was from a suspect interview or were not given any 
information (i.e., blind condition). They found that participants who listened to 
significantly degraded audio clips and were told it was a suspect interview were 7.23 
times more likely to misinterpret the audio than those in the blind condition suggesting 
that blind testing can be used to increase accuracy.   
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Although past research on the effects of blind testing in other areas support the 
notion for blind testing in forensic contexts and the intuitively sensible notion that 
providing forensic examiners with no information about the crime will prevent bias or at 
least the notion of bias, research has yet to provide results on this issue that are directly 
relevant to forensic sciences in general and forensic examiners in particular. The present 
study thus aims to address the gap in the literature and provide a direct examination of 
blind testing procedures within a forensically-relevant context.   
Evidence lineups. Another novel and innovative solution that has been proposed 
by researchers to reduce the effect of cognitive bias on forensic examinations is the use of 
a filler-control method, also known as evidence lineups (Kassin et al., 2013; Saks et al., 
2003; Wells, Wilford, & Smalarz, 2013). Evidence lineups are likened to photo lineup 
identification procedures in principle as they present examiners with at least three 
samples of evidence – the crime scene sample, the suspect sample, and an innocent filler 
sample(s). The suspect sample and the filler sample are presented so that the examiner is 
unaware of which sample belongs to the suspect and which one belongs to the filler (Saks 
et al., 2003). Thus, it is similar to an eyewitness lineup such that the suspect sample is 
present among “foils.” Current examination of evidence in forensic labs are more similar 
to eyewitness “show-ups,” instead of ‘lineups,” which imply that the correct suspect 
sample is present (i.e., a match). Evidence lineups on the other hand are aimed at 
decreasing cognitive bias such that even if examiners are exposed to contextual 
information (e.g., suspect confessed), they still do not know which sample came from the 
suspect and which came from the fillers (Wells et al., 2013).  
17 
 
Research examining evidence lineup procedures suggest that it can increase the 
accuracy of examiners’ judgments (Miller, 1987; Quigley-Mcbride, 2017). For example, 
in a study conducted by Miller (1987), student participants who were enrolled in a crime 
laboratory college course were asked to compare hair samples for four different criminal 
investigations. All participants were given a hair sample that had been recovered from 
each of the four different crime scenes and were given background case information. 
However, for two of the four cases, participants were given only one other suspect hair 
sample to compare to. For the remaining two cases, participants were asked to make the 
comparison using an evidence lineup where they were presented with five suspect-known 
hair samples for each case. Examiners made significantly more incorrect judgments when 
using the standard procedure (comparing evidence found at the crime scene to only one 
suspect sample) compared to when using the evidence lineup. Although this initial study 
highlights the ability of evidence lineups to increase examiners’ accuracy, it did not 
manipulate the presence of contextual bias.  
Quigley-McBride (2017), expanded upon the study conducted by Miller (1987) 
by examining whether using an evidence lineup could successfully eliminate the effect of 
cognitive bias. Undergraduate student participants were assigned to assess a set of 
fingerprints using either a standard procedure (comparing one crime scene fingerprint 
with one suspect fingerprint) or an evidence lineup procedure (comparing one crime 
scene fingerprint with six suspect fingerprints). Some participants received a police report 
containing additional evidence that strongly incriminated the suspect (i.e., DNA found 
under witness’ fingernails matched suspect’s DNA) while other participants did not 
receive additional incriminating evidence. The use of an evidence lineup procedure was 
18 
 
found to successfully decrease the effect of biasing information. Albeit promising, to date 
the Quigley-McBride (2017) study is the only empirical test of whether evidence lineups 
may be useful in protecting forensic examiners from the biasing effects of having 
contextual case information. As the Quigley-McBride (2017) study included only novice, 
inexperienced examiners, it is of crucial importance that future research examining the 
effects of evidence lineups include expert examiners and other stimuli in addition to hair 
samples and fingerprints. Furthermore, filler selection criteria and processes need to be 
transparent and clearly delineated to ensure that forensic experts agree with the 
methodology of these studies. This transparency will not only allow us to systematically 
investigate the importance of training/expertise and type of stimuli/evidence, but also 
contribute more directly to the translation of such research for forensic experts.  
Contextual information management procedures. One of the recently proposed 
solutions for eliminating cognitive bias in forensic analyses is the use of contextual 
information management procedures (Kassin et al., 2013; Edmond et al., 2016; Cole, 
2013; Mattijssen, et al., 2016; Risinger et al., 2002; Thompson, 2011). The goal of such 
procedures is to protect examiners from receiving potentially biasing and task-irrelevant 
information about a case while still providing them with case details that are considered 
necessary and relevant to conducting their analyses.  
One specific approach discussed in the contextual information management 
literature involves the linear sequential unmasking procedure (Dror et al., 2015). It was 
originally introduced as the “sequential unmasking” protocol to be used with DNA 
evidence (Krane et al., 2008), but was later developed into a generalized step-wise 
procedure that could be used with other types of forensic evidence (e.g., fingerprints) and 
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was termed the ‘linear sequential unmasking’ procedure (Dror et al., 2015). The linear 
sequential unmasking procedure requires examiners to receive contextual information 
about the evidence and case in a linear, step-wise fashion. That is, initially examiners are 
only presented with information that is absolutely critical and directly relevant to the 
analyses requested (i.e., task-relevant information) before being asked to make an initial 
comparison. Only after an initial review and comparison of the evidence do examiners 
receive additional case information (i.e., task-irrelevant information). A critical element 
of the linear sequential unmasking procedure is that once examiners are presented with 
additional contextual information, they are allowed to revisit the evidence and make 
changes to their initial judgment. The idea is that examiners’ observations and 
conclusions will be documented at each step (Inman & Rudin, 2013). The linear 
sequential unmasking procedure is usually paired with the suggestion that a case manager 
be appointed to filter out the extraneous, task-irrelevant information and pass on only the 
task-relevant information to the forensic examiner (Archer & Wallman, 2016; Dror et al., 
2015; Found & Ganas, 2013). Unfortunately, because of the lack of empirical research on 
the linear sequential unmasking procedure, there has been no clear explanation as to the 
exact steps that constitute this procedure or any detailed discussion of the challenges that 
may arise when applying it  to real-world cases.  
There have only been a few published case studies examining the use of the linear 
sequential unmasking procedure. For example, Archer and Wallman (2016) described a 
forensic entomologist’s experience with employing the sequential unmasking procedure 
in her lab and claimed that it increased the confidence in the validity of the examiner’s 
judgments. That is, by eliminating contextual influences, the authors anticipated the 
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examiner’s opinion about the evidence to increase in value to the court. However, the 
forensic entomologist who used the procedure served as both the “case manager” and the 
examiner, which led to the accidental disclosure of task-irrelevant and potentially biasing 
information and ultimately defeats the purpose of using sequential unmasking.  
An alternative contextual information management approach is the context-
manager model in which a context manager is responsible for deciding what information 
in a case file is passed along to the forensic examiner (Mattijssen et al., 2016). Thus, the 
context manager is the only individual who has complete access to the contextual 
information (both relevant and irrelevant information) and provides the examiner only 
with the information that is considered relevant to the examination. In this way, the 
forensic examiner conducts their analyses without any biasing information.  
Found and Ganas (2013) described an implementation of the context-manager 
model at the Document Examination Unit of the Victoria Police Forensic Services 
Department. They stated that no negative outcomes had resulted from the implementation 
of the procedure and that the steps they had implemented were not overly time-
consuming or expensive. However, no data were provided to support this claim. As such, 
it remains unknown exactly how much time and money were spent to implement such a 
procedure. In addition, no experimental research on the proposed case-manager model 
has been conducted to test the possible extent to which this method truly reduces the 
effect of cognitive bias when analyzing forensic evidence. Nevertheless, researchers 
continue to strongly advocate its use and, specifically, for the elimination of task-
irrelevant information.  
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Task-relevant versus task-irrelevant information. In addition to the lack of 
information on the specific steps that should be taken by those who wish to use or 
examine different contextual information management procedures, there is also a lack of 
clarity surrounding what type of information is considered task-relevant and task-
irrelevant (Inman & Rudin, 2013; Langenburg, 2017). Importantly, deciding what 
constitutes task-relevant and task-irrelevant information is a much more difficult process 
than what has been suggested by those advocating the use of a linear sequential 
unmasking procedure or context-manager model (Inman & Rudin, 2013). Task-relevant 
information has been generally defined as information that is directly related to the task at 
hand and includes things such as the physical pieces of evidence being analyzed (Dror et 
al., 2015). However, there is no exact definition or list of items that are considered 
“critical” enough to be labeled as task-relevant. This is mostly because what is considered 
to be task-relevant varies vastly on a case-by-case basis and depends largely on the type 
of evidence being examined (e.g., DNA versus fingerprints; Inman & Rudin, 2013; 
Langenburg, 2017). On the other hand, task-irrelevant information is loosely defined as 
information that is composed of “unstated assumptions, information that is collateral, and 
improper expectations and motivations” (Risinger et al., 2002, p.45), a rather ambiguous 
and unspecific definition.  
Practitioners’ Concerns 
Although research examining the effect of cognitive bias in forensic sciences has 
highlighted many potential dangers examiners face when presented with contextual 
information prior to examining evidence, practitioners in the field are often hesitant to 
accept these findings (Butt, 2013; Ostrom, 2009; Thornton, 2010). Specifically, expert 
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examiners have often critiqued this research for using inexperienced students as 
participants, having very small sample sizes and presenting participants with testing 
materials beyond their level of expertise. In addition, expert examiners have various 
concerns regarding the practicality of the recommendations researchers strongly advocate 
for, such as blind testing, evidence lineups and linear sequential unmasking procedures 
(Risinger et al., 2002; Thornton, 2010). Expert examiners argue that many of these 
recommendations would require significantly more resources, would require a host of 
decisions on an individual case level, and could in fact hinder their ability to make 
accurate interpretations of the evidence (Risinger et al., 2002; Thornton, 2010).  
 Drawbacks to proposed solutions. As previously discussed, blind testing, 
evidence lineups, and linear sequential unmasking procedures are all methods researchers 
recommend forensic examiners use to decrease the effects of cognitive bias when 
examining and interpreting evidence. However, each of these methods have their 
individual limitations and drawbacks that often deter real-world forensic examiners from 
incorporating them into their daily lab work. For example, practitioners continuously 
argue that blind testing may actually hinder their ability to accurately evaluate a piece of 
forensic evidence because certain contextual information is needed to properly analyze a 
piece of evidence (Risinger et al., 2002). For instance, fingerprint examiners may need to 
know the type of surface and where exactly the latent fingerprint was collected from. 
Such information (e.g., whether prints were lifted from the inside or outside of a car 
window) can inform examiners of extraneous factors (e.g., weather conditions) that can 
affect the quality of the print and subsequent analyses. Because of this common critique, 
researchers proposed the linear sequential unmasking procedure and the context-manager 
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model, which would allow examiners to have the necessary contextual information while 
remaining blind to task-irrelevant information that could bias their conclusions.  
However, contextual information management procedures have not been fully 
accepted by forensic examiners either. Practitioners are often concerned with the 
additional resources that would be needed to implement a successful linear sequential 
unmasking procedure or a case-manager model in their lab (Charlton, 2013). For 
example, a case manager would need to be hired and extensively trained across forensic 
disciplines to decide what information could and should be made available to examiners, 
a difficult task that arguably escapes researchers outside the specific discipline. Hiring a 
case manager would also strain already existing financial resources and require that 
practitioners work within “leaner working models” (Charlton, 2013, p. 72). However, 
recent work on the implementation of a “case-manager model,” suggests it has minimal 
impact on the number of additional personnel required for the protocol, cost, or time 
(Found & Ganas, 2013).  
Implementing evidence lineups would also necessitate more resources considering 
it would require an additional examiner to create the evidence lineup with similar-looking 
‘foils’ (Risinger et al., 2002). Finding similar-lookinf foils is a particularly difficult task 
considering the variation of evidence (e.g., fingerprints) in terms of difficulty and 
similarity. For example, to properly create an evidence lineup for fingerprints, it would 
first require fingerprint foils to be piloted with a number of fingerprint experts who assess 
hundreds of prints to obtain average difficulty and similarity ratings for pairs of 
fingerprints. Thus, in order to properly select similar-looking ‘foils’ for evidence lineups, 
examiners would have to obtain from expert examiners an average similarity rating for 
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the target piece of evidence and each potential foil to ensure an “unbiased” lineup. If 
proper measures are not taken to obtain truly similar-looking foils, then the target piece 
of evidence may simply be chosen because it stands out from the rest of the samples in 
the evidence lineup.  
 Furthermore, a survey conducted by Kukucka, Kassin, Zapf, and Dror (2017), 
found that the majority of forensic examiners they questioned believed they were immune 
to bias or could reduce the effect of bias simply by willpower. As such, similar to other 
professions, forensic examiners may underestimate the extent to which bias may 
influence their work without a clear understanding of the automatic processes underlying 
this effect, which in turn may decrease their openness to modifying procedures. 
Commentaries written by forensic examiners about cognitive bias research often suggest 
practitioners feel insulted by such research and proposed solutions. For example, 
Thornton, an Emeritus Professor of Forensic Science at the University of California at 
Berkeley with 20 years of experience in operational crime laboratories wrote “I reject the 
insinuation that we do not have the wit or the intellectual capacity to deal with bias, of 
whatever sort” (Thornton, 2010, p. 1663). Despite the fact that research strongly suggests 
all individuals, regardless of profession, can fall prey to cognitive bias, concerns voiced 
by practitioners regarding the various drawbacks that come with many of the proposed 
solutions highlight the need for truly bi-directional research collaborations between 
researchers and practitioners to tackle cognitive bias in forensic examinations.   
Participant samples used in research. Another concern practitioners have raised 
regarding the existing research examining the effect of cognitive bias in forensic contexts 
is the use of student participants who have no experience or training analyzing forensic 
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evidence (Ostrom, 2009). Although some research does suggest that contextual 
information, such as the decision of a prior examiner (Dror & Charlton, 2006; Dror et al., 
2005), can also influence experts, sample sizes in studies using experts tend to be very 
small, mainly because of the difficulty of recruiting experts in the field to participate in 
research. For example, Dror and Charlton (2006) examined the effect of bias on 
fingerprint analyses using only six fingerprint examiners. Similarly, in a second separate 
study Dror, Charlton and Peron (2005), relied on data from five fingerprint examiners. It 
is important to point out, however, that both of these studies used a within-participant 
design, such that each pair of prints presented to the examiner-participants had been 
previously analyzed by the same examiner within the normal course of their work. 
Although using a within-participant design increases power, a sample of five to six expert 
examiners arguably does not provide a sufficient experimental power and thus basis to 
convincingly argue to practitioners that their own judgments can also be influenced by 
cognitive bias.   
In addition, the concern of using students who have no experience analyzing 
forensic evidence is valid considering research has found that experience can moderate 
the effect of cognitive bias (Langenburg et al., 2009). For example, in a study conducted 
by Langenburg and colleagues (2009), both novice and expert examiners were recruited 
as participants. Novice participants were composed of students with no experience or 
training in fingerprint analyses, whereas expert participants were trained fingerprint 
examiners recruited at an international conference. All participants were assigned either 
to a control group, a high bias group or a low bias group. The control group received no 
contextual information whereas the two bias groups received information regarding a 
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previous examiner’s decision on the fingerprints that were to be analyzed. The low bias 
group was simply told that the previous examiner was trained to competency and the high 
bias group was told that the previous examiner was an internationally recognized expert. 
They found that novices were more likely to agree with the high bias prompt than were 
experts suggesting novices may be more influenced by bias than experts. Unfortunately, 
the majority of research examining the effects of cognitive bias on forensic evidence 
examination relies on collecting data from undergraduate students who have no 
experience analyzing forensic evidence such as fingerprints – a skill that requires a 
significant amount of training and expertise.  
Type of evidence. Research has found that cognitive bias can affect the evaluation 
and interpretation of various types of evidence (e.g., Dror & Hampikian, 2011; Elaad et 
al., 1994; Kerstholt et al., 2010; Lange et al., 2011). However, different types of evidence 
require vastly different levels and training. For example, analyzing DNA evidence 
requires extensive academic training, analyzing fingerprint evidence requires extensive 
specialized training differing in content and time from other pattern evidence such as 
footwear impression evidence, which requires only basic visual-spatial abilities 
(International Association for Identification, 2018; Sirchie, 2018). Taken together, 
different pieces of forensic evidence require different levels of specialized training. 
Therefore, presenting participants, who have no forensic evaluation experience, with 
stimuli that require specialized training (e.g., fingerprints), may find an effect of bias not 
because of the presence of contextual information, but because of the difficulty of the 
task itself (Butt, 2013). The more ambiguous a decision-making task, the more likely a 
participant is to look for external cues to guide his/her decision, thus inflating the 
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estimated effect of cognitive bias (Dror et al., 2005). As such, results from studies using 
inexperienced examiners are likely overestimating the effects of cognitive bias. The use 
of stimuli that require specialized training coupled with the use of inexperienced 
examiners are therefore important and valid concerns practitioners have regarding the 
current body of work. The sampling and stimulus material issues present in the body of 
work thus far render it difficult for researchers to convince forensic experts of the 
likelihood and extent of cognitive bias found in these studies and to successfully advocate 
for the implementation of bias-reducing procedures. 
Present Study 
Decades of research on the effects of cognitive bias suggest that having 
expectations and prior beliefs can affect the way an individual interprets subsequent 
information (Rosenthal, 1994). Specifically, individuals tend to look for information that 
confirms their beliefs while ignoring information that disconfirms their beliefs (Ask & 
Granhag, 2005; Nickerson, 1998). Research examining the effect of cognitive bias within 
forensic contexts also finds a similar pattern of results, which has led to the development 
of various procedures including blind testing and contextual information management 
procedures, to decrease the effect of cognitive bias (Found & Ganas, 2013; Kassin et al., 
2013; Saks et al., 2003). However, only few studies have examined blind testing methods 
and their ability to reduce the effect of bias on analyses of forensic evidence, with no 
study to date experimentally testing contextual information management procedures to 
eliminate task-irrelevant information with fingerprint and footwear impression evidence. 
Relatedly, this lack of research has resulted in only a vague description of the specific 
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steps that forensic examiners should take if implementing a linear sequential unmasking 
procedure or a case-manager model in their lab.  
The current study directly compares the effects of blind testing, redaction of task-
irrelevant information and informed testing on forensic evidence analyses. It also offers a 
first operationalization of eliminating task-irrelevant information within a field setting, in 
collaboration with real-world forensic experts from the Miami-Dade Forensic Sciences 
Bureau by using redaction procedures to eliminate any information from a lab analysis 
request form (LAR) that is not necessary for examination purposes. To fully test the 
potential for cognitive bias while investigating the strategy of contextual information 
management procedures, the proposed study assigned participants to receive either no 
information about the case summary (i.e., blind condition), a partially redacted LAR case 
summary (i.e., task-irrelevant details blacked-out), or a non-blind LAR summary (i.e., all 
case details available). In addition, after an initial judgment of the evidence was made, all 
participants received a full case summary (with all details available) and were asked if 
they would like to re-analyze the evidence, likened to real-world scenarios in which 
examiners receive additional case information after analyzing evidence when using the 
linear sequential unmasking procedure (Saks et al., 2003).  
In line with past research on cognitive bias and forensic evidence analyses 
demonstrating that having contextual information about a case, including suggestive and 
guilt-presumptive details about a suspect, can result in more match judgments, than not 
having contextual case information (e.g., Dror et al., 2005; Kassin & Kukucka, 2014), it 
was hypothesized that redacting task-irrelevant information from LARs would reduce the 
effect of contextual bias. Specifically, it was hypothesized that participants provided with 
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a partially redacted LAR (i.e., no guilt-presumptive suspect information available) would 
be more accurate in their judgments compared to participants who received a non-blind, 
complete LAR (i.e., had guilt-presumptive suspect information available). That is, 
examiners who receive the complete LAR would be less likely to judge a pair of non-
matching evidence samples as non-matches (i.e., correct exclusion) and more likely to 
judge a pair of non-matching evidence samples as matching (i.e., false ID).  
It was also predicted that blind testing procedures would decrease the effect of 
bias such that participants would be more accurate at making match and non-match 
judgments of evidence (i.e., more correct exclusions and fewer false IDs) compared to 
participants who were provided with all case details about the case. However, it was also 
predicted that participants who received no information about the crime would be less 
likely to correctly judge a pair of matching samples of evidence as matching (i.e., correct 
ID) and more likely to incorrectly judge a pair of matching evidence samples as non-
matches (i.e., incorrect exclusions) than those who received a partially redacted form, as 
participants who were not given any information about the case did not have available to 
them any task-relevant information compared to participants who were given a partially 
redacted LAR. Task-relevant information is believed to help examiners make more 
informed and accurate decisions (Inman & Rudin, 2013); participants who did not have 
this information are thus expected to be at a greater disadvantage to those who did have 
the task-relevant information on the partially redacted LAR. For example, knowing that 
the fingerprints being analyzed where found inside of a car allows examiners to discount 
any odd marks on the fingerprints as being a result from weather conditions.   
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To obtain a fine-grained understanding of how each of these LAR conditions 
affect examiners’ judgments, a signal detection approach was used. Specifically, 
examiners were presented with both matching and non-matching samples of evidence in 
order to calculate their discrimination accuracy, which measures the ability to accurately 
discriminate between matching and non-matching pairs of evidence. Discrimination 
accuracy takes into account the number of correct match (correct IDs) and false match 
decisions (false IDs) made. Thus, in line with the previous hypotheses, it was predicted 
that those provided with a partially redacted LAR would have significantly better 
discrimination accuracy than those who were provided with a blind or non-blind LAR as 
they would be more likely to render a correct match decision and less likely to make an 
incorrect match decision.  
Furthermore, individuals’ response bias was calculated to measure examiners’ 
match and non-match judgement tendencies. A “match response bias” was defined as an 
individual’s tendency to judge a pair of evidence samples as matching regardless of 
whether they were matches or not, whereas a “non-match response bias” was defined as 
an individual’s tendency to make a non-match judgment regardless of whether they were 
non-matches or not. It was predicted that examiners who received the non-blind LAR 
would be more likely to show a match response bias compared to those who received the 
blind or partially redacted LAR because participants provided with the non-blind LAR 
would have information available to them that would bias them into making more match 
judgments (i.e., suspects are in custody) regardless of the evidence samples’ ground truth. 
Finally, because of a lack of information, participants in the blind condition were 
predicted to be less confident in their judgements about the evidence compared to 
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participants who received either all the information about the case or a partially redacted 
case summary. Results from the present study thus served to inform which bias-reducing 
procedures allow examiners to be the most accurate and confident in their decisions.   
A secondary aim of the present study was to compare novice and expert 
examiners’ performance when conducting forensic examinations as well as their 
vulnerabilities to contextual bias. Although some research suggests that experts can be 
influenced by task-irrelevant information (Dror et al., 2006), the majority of research 
examining the effect of cognitive bias on analysis of forensic evidence relies on 
collecting data from undergraduate students who have no experience analyzing forensic 
evidence that require at least some level of specialized training (Dror et al., 2005; 
Smalarz, Madon, Yang, Guyll, & Buck, 2016). Using participants who have no 
experience analyzing forensic evidence may inflate the effect cognitive bias may have on 
examiners’ interpretation of evidence as a consequence of its increased level of difficulty 
and thus ambiguity when assessed by novices. The present study therefore systematically 
investigated the differences in susceptibility to bias between novice and expert 
examiners. It was hypothesized that novices would be more inaccurate (i.e., make more 
incorrect match and non-match decisions) and have poorer discrimination accuracy than 
expert forensic examiners, because of their lack of experience in analyzing the stimuli 
used in the proposed study. For similar reasons, it was predicted that novice examiners 
would be less confident in their judgments compared to expert examiners.  
In addition, it was predicted that the main effect of experience would be qualified 
by an interaction between contextual information available on the LAR and experience. 
Specifically, because of the lack of experience and thus increased level of the difficulty 
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of the task, novices were expected to be more influenced than experts by the task-
irrelevant contextual information when it was available (i.e., non-blind LAR condition) 
compared to when they were kept blind to case details or when task-irrelevant 
information had been redacted.  
Not only is it important to systematically investigate the possibility that research 
conducted on undergraduate students may be inflating the presence of bias in the analysis 
of forensic evidence, but it is also important to examine how the type of stimuli used in a 
study can influence the likelihood of finding an effect of bias. Thus, the third aim of the 
current study was to investigate the effect of contextual bias on examiners’ evaluation of 
forensic evidence as a function of stimulus material. Specifically, the present study 
compared the effect of cognitive bias when comparing fingerprints and footwear 
impressions, with fingerprint examination requiring significantly more expertise and 
training than footwear impression analyses (International Association for Identification, 
2018; Sirchie, 2018). This comparison could help inform the specific contexts in which 
cognitive bias may play a redcued versus enhanced role in forensic examinations. In 
addition, as past research has failed to manipulate the type of stimuli presented to 
participants, it is difficult to compare results across studies that differ in the type of 
stimuli presented (e.g., footwear impressions versus handwriting samples versus 
fingerprints). Thus, the present study was the first to directly compare the effect of 
cognitively biasing conditions across different forensic stimuli.  
It was hypothesized that contextual information would have a weaker impact on 
examiners’ evaluations when the to-be-examined forensic evidence required less 
specialized training (i.e., footwear impressions) compared to more difficult evidence 
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samples (i.e., fingerprints). Finally, it was predicted that there would be an interaction 
between examiner experience and stimulus material such that differences found between 
novice examiners and expert forensic examiners would be greatest when evaluating 
fingerprint evidence compared to footwear impression evidence because novice, 
undergraduate examiners would be at a significantly larger disadvantage when analyzing 
fingerprints. Thus, novice examiners would make a larger number of mistakes, have 
poorer discrimination accuracy, and be less confident in their judgments compared to 
expert examiners, but more so when judging fingerprint evidence compared to footwear 
impression evidence.  
In conclusion, the present study had the following primary objectives: (a) examine 
the effect of contextual bias on examiners’ evaluation of forensic evidence by varying the 
amount of pre-comparison information available to participants, (b) compare novice and 
expert examiners’ performance when conducting forensic analyses and their 
vulnerabilities to contextual bias, and (c) investigate the effect of contextual bias on 
examiners’ evaluation of different types of forensic evidence. Together, these objectives 
can inform both researchers and practitioners of the impact and feasibility of several 
proposed solutions in reducing the effect of contextual bias across different forensic 
domains. In addition, the current study directly addresses concerns voiced by forensic 
scientists and practitioners including the use of undergraduate students as participants and 
using stimuli that are considered to require more specialized training.  
Two pilot studies were first conducted for the purpose of stimulus material 
selection and to minimize the potential of confounding variables in the Main Study. Pilot 
Study One was conducted to select the fingerprint evidence stimuli to be used in Pilot 
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Study Two and the Main Study. The primary aim of Pilot Study One was to obtain 
ratings for fingerprint stimuli pairs from undergraduate students who had no experience 
analyzing fingerprint evidence in order to select fingerprint pairs that were of comparable 
difficulty level to latent fingerprint experts’ ratings. In order to minimize the presence of 
a confounding variable (i.e., difference in perceived task difficulty) fingerprints of 
comparable difficulty for experts and novices were selected from Pilot Study One so that 
examiner experience, and not task difficulty, would yield any potential differences 
between novice and expert examiners the Main Study. Pilot Study Two was conducted to 
test the bias in the central manipulations of the Main Study. Specifically, the main aim of 
Pilot Study Two was to ensure that the LAR containing all the case information resulted 
in more incorrect match judgements than the LAR with no case information (i.e., blind 
testing procedure).  
CHAPTER II 
PILOT STUDY ONE METHODS 
Participants 
A total of 82 students (N = 82) at a large southeastern university were recruited 
via the university’s psychology research participation system in exchange for course 
credit. The final sample of 82 students was 78% female (n = 64) and representative of the 
community from which they were drawn (67.1% Hispanic, 14.6% African American, 
9.8% Caucasian, 3.7% Asian American, and 4.9% Other). The sample ranged in age from 
18 to 34 years (M = 20.93, SD = 3.49).   
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Materials  
Match fingerprint pair stimuli. Fingerprints from a previous study examining 
the efficacy of the ACE-V fingerprint analyses procedure conducted by the Miami-Dade 
Forensic Services Bureau (MDFSB) (Pacheco, Cerchiai, & Stoiloff, 2014) were used for 
the current study. In the previous study, fingerprint standards and multiple latent prints 
were collected from nine different individuals. Latent prints are prints lifted from objects 
and surfaces whereas standard prints are those collected directly from the individual. A 
total of 80 final photographs of latent prints collected from flat and curved surfaces (i.e., 
plastic, tile, metal and glass) were provided by each of the nine volunteers (out of 720 
total). Latent prints were lifted using black powder, tape, and white backing cards. These 
cards were then scanned to create individual photographs. Each individual’s prints were 
then rated by three certified latent print examiners on several dimensions including 
strength of value of latent print, whether the latent was in agreement with the standard, 
and difficulty of the comparison. The strength of value of the latent print referred to the 
clarity of the latent print and the agreement referred to whether the latent print and the 
standard matched in clarity and had the same minutiae present. Minutiae were defined as 
those characteristics of a fingerprint that make it unique compared to other fingerprints 
(e.g., bifurcations, ending ridges, dots).  
The difficulty level of the comparisons was calculated by averaging the scores the 
print received on the strength of value and agreement with standard ratings. Each print 
was then categorized into one of the three following categories: (a) insufficient to 
difficult, (b) difficult to moderate, or (c) moderate to easy. On the basis of the study 
conducted by Pacheco and colleagues (2014), a total of 15 latent prints along with their 
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corresponding standard print were classified into the ‘moderate to easy’ category by three 
forensic examiners, nine were classified as ‘difficult to moderate,’ and 12 were classified 
as ‘insufficient to difficult.’ 
In order to address a critical limitation and confound present in previous research 
examining the effect of cognitive bias in forensic analyses, ‘moderate to easy’ 
fingerprints shown to expert examiners in Pachecho and colleagues’ (2014) initial study 
were pilot-tested with student examiners to ensure that the fingerprints chosen for the 
Main Study were rated as ‘moderate to easy’ by both forensic experts and students, who 
would constitute the participant pool in the proposed Main Study. The decision to include 
only the ‘moderate to easy’ difficulty level in the proposed final study as opposed to 
fingerprints categorized into one of the other two more difficult categories was 
determined because forensic examiners typically use specialized fingerprint marking 
software programs (i.e., CSIpix and PiAnoS) to analyze fingerprints which was unable to 
be included in this study. That is, for logistic purposes, the proposed study used Qualtrics, 
an online research system that allows the distribution of all research materials to 
participating students and experts across the country. As Qualtrics does not allow the 
incorporation of the fingerprint marking software commonly used by forensic examiners 
and student examiners are unfamiliar with this software, the researcher instead opted for 
the inclusion of only ‘easy to moderate’ fingerprints. This allowed for both student and 
expert examiners to compare prints without software while simultaneously eliminating 
the alternative explanation for differences across expertise being due to familiarity with 
the software.  
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On the basis of the results of Pachecho and colleagues’ (2014) initial study, the 
final stimulus material for matching fingerprint pairs for this pilot study consisted of a 
total of 15 standard and 15 latent ‘moderate to easy’ difficulty level fingerprints. In 
addition, in order to increase the range of ratings participants used, two ‘difficult to 
moderate’ and two ‘insufficient to difficult’ matching fingerprint pairs were also included 
into the final stimulus material of Pilot Study One, amounting to a total of 19 matching 
fingerprint pairs.  
Non-match fingerprint pair stimuli. Each of the 19 standard prints were 
combined with each of the latent prints of the same difficulty category that did not 
originate from the same person in order to develop the non-matching print pairs. Thus, a 
total of 200 non-matching fingerprint pairs were created for piloting.  
Procedure  
Student participants were scheduled to come into the lab to participate in the 
study. Once participants arrived at the lab, they were seated in front of a computer. All 
study procedures were administered via Qualtrics. After online consent was obtained, 
each student participant was randomly presented with 13 of the 15 ‘moderate to easy’ 
matching fingerprint pairs, one of the two ‘difficult to moderate’ matching fingerprint 
pairs, one of the two ‘insufficient to difficult’ matching fingerprint pairs, and 15 of the 
non-matching fingerprint pairs, totaling 30 fingerprint pairs.  
Fingerprint pairs were shown one at a time and participants were asked to judge 
each pair of prints on three different rating scales that were similar to those used by the 
expert latent print examiners in Pachecho and colleagues’ (2014) study. To account for 
undergraduate students’ lack of expertise, the rating scale was modified. Specifically, 
38 
 
students were not asked to count the number of minutiae on each fingerprint and were 
instead simply asked to rate the clarity of the latent print on a 7-point scale with higher 
numbers indicating better clarity. Additionally, after viewing each pair of prints, students 
were asked to rate the similarity between the fingerprint pairs on a 7-point scale with 
higher numbers indicating higher similarity. Finally, students were asked to determine 
whether the prints were a match, non-match or inconclusive and rate the difficulty of the 
comparison on a 7-point scale with higher numbers indicating higher difficulty.  
CHAPTER III 
PILOT STUDY ONE RESULTS 
The clarity of the latent print (reverse coded), similarity of prints, and difficulty of 
comparison ratings were averaged across participants for each pair of fingerprints. Those 
pairs receiving an average difficulty rating between five and seven points were 
categorized into the ‘insufficient to difficult category,’ those between three and five 
points were categorized as ‘difficult to moderate,’ and those between one and three points 
were categorized as ‘moderate to easy.’ Once all fingerprint pairs had been categorized 
into one of the three categories, only those fingerprint pairs that both experts and students 
had labeled as ‘moderate to easy’ were selected to be used in Pilot Study Two and the 
Main Study. 
Descriptive statistics were used to analyze the average difficulty rating for each of 
the matching and non-matching fingerprint pairs. Once the average difficulty rating was 
calculated for each pair of fingerprints, they were classified into one of the three 
difficulty level categories (moderate to easy, difficult to moderate, and insufficient to 
difficult). Frequencies for the total number of fingerprints classified as ‘moderate to 
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easy,’ ‘difficult to moderate,’ and ‘insufficient to difficult’ were computed in addition to 
the percentage of correct, incorrect, and inconclusive decisions made for each match and 
non-match fingerprint across the three difficulty levels.  
Match Fingerprint Judgments 
Across all three difficulty category levels, none (0%, n = 0) of the matching 
fingerprint pairs were perceived by students as ‘moderate to easy’ or ‘insufficient to 
difficult.’ Instead, all (100%, n = 19) were classified as ‘difficult to moderate.’ In 
addition, for ‘moderate to easy’ match fingerprint pairs, the majority of participants made 
accurate match decisions (47%), followed by inconclusive decisions (27.91%) and 
incorrect non-match decisions (24.59%). For ‘difficult to moderate’ match fingerprint 
pairs, most participants made inconclusive decisions (40.1%) followed by incorrect non-
match decisions (36.2%) and correct match decisions (23.7%). For ‘insufficient to 
difficult’ match fingerprint pairs, the majority of participants made inconclusive 
decisions (78%) followed by incorrect non-match decisions (20.7%) and correct match 
decisions (1.3%; see Figure 1). 
Non-Match Fingerprint Judgments 
Similar results were found for non-match fingerprint pairs such that across all 
three difficulty categories, the majority of comparisons were rated as being ‘difficult to 
moderate’ (97.62%). Specifically, for fingerprint pairs in the ‘moderate to easy’ category, 
only 5.1% of the pairs were perceived by students as ‘moderate to easy,’ with the 
majority of students (92.86%) rating them as ‘difficult to moderate’ and some even 
perceiving them as ‘insufficient to difficult’ (1.5%). For fingerprint pairs in the ‘difficult 
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to moderate’ and ‘insufficient to difficult’ category, all pairs (100%) were perceived as 
being ‘difficult to moderate’ by student participants. 
In addition, for ‘moderate to easy’ non-match fingerprint pairs, the majority of 
participants made accurate non-match decisions (50.32%), followed by inconclusive 
decisions (29.05%) and incorrect match decisions (20.64%). For ‘difficult to moderate’ 
non-match fingerprint pairs, most participants made inconclusive decisions (49%) 
followed by correct non-match decisions (33.80%), and incorrect match decisions 
(17.20%). For ‘insufficient to difficult’ match fingerprint pairs, the majority of 
participants made inconclusive decisions (71.05%) followed by correct non-match 
decisions (28.95%) and no participants made an incorrect match decision (0%; see Figure 
2). 
Selection of Match and Non-Match Fingerprint Pairs for Pilot Study Two 
Unfortunately, albeit unsurprisingly, students perceived the fingerprint 
comparisons to be more difficult than the expert latent fingerprint examiners as evidenced 
by the very few pairs categorized by students as ‘moderate to easy.’ Since none of the 
match fingerprints were perceived to be ‘moderate to easy,’ the four match fingerprint 
pairs with the lowest average difficulty ratings were selected to be used for Pilot Study 
Two. For selection of the non-match fingerprint pairs to be used in Pilot Study Two, all 
non-match fingerprints that fell within the range of the difficulty rating of the four match 
fingerprint pairs selected were grouped together. From these, four non-matching 
fingerprint pairs were randomly selected to pair (in terms of difficulty level) with the 
matching fingerprint pairs. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PILOT STUDY TWO METHODS 
Design 
A 2 (Contextual Information: blind vs. non-blind) X 2 (Stimulus Material: 
footwear impression vs. fingerprint) mixed factorial design was employed with stimulus 
material and stimulus pair manipulated within participants. The primary aim of Pilot 
Study Two was to test the bias of the central manipulation of the Main Study.  
Participants 
A total of 96 (N = 96) students at a large southeastern university were recruited 
via the University’s psychology research participation system in exchange for course 
credit. Of these participants, two participants were excluded because they did not 
consent, 36 participants because they did not pass the instructions quiz, and 10 
participants because they did not pass the manipulation check question. The final sample 
of 48 (n = 48) students was 83.3% female (n = 40) and representative of the community 
from which they were drawn (68.8% Hispanic, 25% African American, 4.2% Caucasian, 
and 2.1% Asian American). They ranged in age from 19 to 61 years (M = 22.94, SD = 
7.52).   
Materials  
Lab analysis request forms. Lab analysis request forms mirrored those used by 
the MDFSB (see Appendix A). They contained basic information such as the name of the 
lead investigator, type of offense, name of suspects, name of victims, description of the 
case, and description of the evidence. These pieces of information are commonly found 
on LARs (sometimes referred to as evidence submission forms) used across the United 
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States (Gardner, Kelley, Murrie, & Blaisdell, 2019). Specifically, in a recent study, 
Gardner and colleagues (2019) collected LARs from different forensic labs across the 
United States to gather information on the type of information that is typically included 
on such forms. They found that many request similar information compared to the LAR 
used in the proposed study. For example, 94.8% ask about the type of offense, 94.8% ask 
for the name of suspect(s), 92.8% ask for the name of victim(s), 45.5% ask for a 
description of the case, and 88.7% ask for a description of the evidence. As such, the 
LAR used in the proposed study was developed in accordance with this information to be 
representative of information typically gathered in other U.S. forensic lab’s LARs.  
LAR case summaries. A total of two versions of the LAR were piloted in the 
present study to ensure differences between providing all case summary details (i.e., non-
blind condition) and providing no case summary details (i.e., blind condition) on 
examiners’ judgements of fingerprint and footwear impression evidence. Specifically, 
participants in the ‘non-blind’ condition received all case details in the summary, as is 
currently the case in the MDFSB, which consisted of both task-relevant and irrelevant 
(e.g., potentially biasing) information. The case summary was developed in close 
collaboration with a forensic expert to allow for a realistic version and portrayed a real-
world armed robbery in Miami, Florida that involved one female victim and two male 
perpetrators. In addition, the case summary included various pieces of information that 
are commonly found on LARs, but have the potential to bias examiners’ decisions when 
analyzing forensic evidence.  
Initially, within the non-blind LAR, participants were made aware that both 
subjects were in custody, were given information about the suspects’ criminal history and 
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were also told that surveillance footage of the two suspects committing the crime was 
obtained. The objective was to bias participants into thinking that the suspects in custody 
were likely to be guilty, potentially leading participants to make more incorrect match 
judgements when analyzing non-matching pieces of forensic evidence compared to 
participants who did not received such biasing information of the suspects. On the other 
hand, participants in the ‘blind’ condition were given a case summary containing only the 
word “routine” (see Appendix B). This served as the ‘blind’ condition because 
participants had neither case-specific nor biasing information that was provided to 
participants in the non-blind condition. After consulting with the commander of the 
MDFSB, the word “Routine” was chosen to be entered in the case summary section of 
the blind LAR to increase external validity as this term is commonly found on LARs, 
despite the fact that it provides examiners with no substantive information about the case.   
Preliminary analyses conducted during the initial stages of data collection 
revealed an unsuccessful manipulation of the LAR form such that we found a significant 
effect of LAR form on participant’s accuracy rate, F(1, 82) = 4.34, p = .040, in the 
opposite expected direction. Specifically, participants who received the biasing LAR had 
higher accuracy rates (M = 0.46, SD = 0.28) than participants who received the blind 
LAR (M = 0.33, SD = 0.25). It was believed that some of the information provided to 
participants in the biasing condition (i.e., surveillance footage of suspects committing the 
crime) led student participants to become particularly skeptical of the case summary 
information and pay more attention to the evidence when analyzing the footwear 
impressions and fingerprint evidence. As a result, we decided to decrease the level of 
“obvious” bias by eliminating the surveillance footage evidence found in the biasing 
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LAR case summary for the remainder of pilot study two. However, participants were still 
provided with information regarding the suspects’ custody status and criminal history 
along with the remaining pieces of information regarding the armed robbery (see 
Appendix C).   
Fingerprint stimuli pairs. Fingerprints selected for this pilot study were chosen 
from the same pool of fingerprints used for Pilot Study One. However, for Pilot Study 
Two only the easiest non-matching fingerprint pairs were used. Due to the Pilot Study 
One results (no match fingerprint pairs were categorized as ‘moderate to easy’), it was 
necessary to choose non-matching fingerprint pairs that had comparable difficulty ratings 
to matching fingerprint pairs since both match and non-match fingerprint pairs would be 
used for the Main Study. Thus, four non-matching fingerprint pairs were randomly 
selected from a pool of non-matching fingerprint pairs that had similar difficulty ratings 
as the matching fingerprint pairs with the lowest difficulty ratings (Mdifficulty = 3.37 – 
4.29). Four fingerprint pairs were chosen for stimulus generalization purposes. The 
average difficulty rating for each of the four fingerprint pairs did not significantly differ 
from one another (all p > .05). Of the four randomly selected non-matching fingerprint 
pairs chosen for Pilot Study Two, each participant was presented with only two 
fingerprint pairs due to study material, design and procedures. That is, on the LAR 
provided to participants, there were only two fingerprints that were collected at the crime 
scene. 
Footwear impression stimuli pairs. Footwear impressions were selected from a 
footwear impressions matching exam that was previously used by the MDFSB as part of 
their interview for entry level forensic examiners. The exam consisted of 10 matching 
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and 94 non-matching footwear impression pairs. These footwear impressions’ difficulty 
levels had been piloted as part of another ongoing study. A total of 145 undergraduate 
students were recruited as part of this previous pilot study and were asked to classify each 
matching and non-matching footwear impression pair as either a match, non-match, or 
made an inconclusive decision. They were also asked to rate their confidence in the 
decision and the level of difficulty on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = not at all 
difficult/confident to 7 = extremely difficult/confident). Footwear impression pairs were 
categorized into three levels based on these pilot data. Similar to the fingerprint evidence 
pairs in Pilot Study One, footwear impression pairs were categorized as either a) 
insufficient to difficult, b) difficult to moderate, or c) moderate to easy.  
Similar to the fingerprint evidence, an average difficulty and confidence rating for 
each footwear impression pair was computed. Those comparisons that received between 
five to seven points were categorized into the ‘insufficient to difficult’ category, those 
with three to five points were categorized as ‘difficult to moderate,’ and those which 
received one to three points were categorized as ‘moderate to easy.’ For the current pilot 
study only ‘moderate to easy’ non-matching footwear impression pairs were used. 
Specifically, of the 94 non-matching pairs, 25 were labeled as ‘moderate to easy.’ Of 
these 25, four non-matching footwear impression pairs were randomly selected to be used 
for Pilot Study Two for stimulus generalization purposes. Each participant was randomly 
presented with two of the possible four footwear impression pairs due to study material, 
design and procedures. That is, on the LAR provided to participants, there were only two 
footwear impressions that were collected at the crime scene.  
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Procedure  
Participants completed all study procedures via a Qualtrics online survey. After 
online consent was obtained, participants received basic task instructions. Specifically, 
they were told that they would be presented with an LAR and given information 
explaining what an LAR is and the type of information that can be found on the form. 
Participants were also informed that they would be asked to analyze various pieces of 
evidence from a crime scene including two footwear impressions and two fingerprints 
and make a match, non-match, or inconclusive decision. A matching pair was defined as 
a pair of prints originating from the same source (i.e., they came from the same person) 
and a non-matching pair was defined as prints originating from different sources (i.e., 
they came from different people). An inconclusive decision was defined as prints having 
insufficient detail for a conclusive determination to be made (e.g., “I don’t know” 
response). Participants were then instructed to carefully read the LAR before making any 
decisions and were told that they could refer back to the LAR whenever they felt 
necessary.  
Once participants read and understood the initial instructions, they were randomly 
presented with one of the two possible LARs (i.e., blind or non-blind LAR). After 
reading the LAR, they were randomly shown one of the four pieces of evidence. 
Specifically, they were shown either one of the four possible non-matching footwear 
impression pairs or one of the four non-matching fingerprint pairs. After analyzing the 
first pair of evidence, they were asked to make a match or non-match decision. The LAR 
was available to participants during each comparison. After completing the ratings for the 
first pair of evidence (either fingerprint or footwear impression), they were shown the 
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second piece of evidence. The same procedure was employed for the remaining pieces of 
evidence. Once participants had completed comparing all four pieces of evidence, they 
were provided with a demographics questionnaire. After the completion of the 
demographics questionnaire, participants were debriefed and thanked for their time.  
Coding of Outcome Variables 
Match and non-match judgments. Participants’ match and non-match 
judgements were coded as correct or incorrect. As all pairs of evidence presented to 
participants were non-matches, all match judgements were coded as incorrect and all 
non-match judgments were coded as correct. Average accuracy scores for fingerprints 
and footwear impressions were calculated by dividing the total number of correct 
judgments made by the total number of judgments made. 
CHAPTER V 
PILOT STUDY TWO RESULTS 
 Only data from the participants recruited after the non-blind LAR was updated 
were included in the following analyses. Thus, participants who received the original 
non-blind LAR which included the surveillance footage detail were excluded from all 
subsequent analyses.   
Match Judgments 
 A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to investigate the effect of LAR and 
evidence type on number of incorrect match judgments made. There was no significant 
effect of LAR, F(1, 46) = 0.86, p = .358 on number of incorrect match judgments. 
However, there was a significant effect of evidence type, F(1, 46) = 39.09, p < .001 such 
that participants made more incorrect match judgments when judging footwear 
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impression evidence (M = 1.11, SE = 0.12) than when judging fingerprint evidence (M  = 
0.36, SE = 0.08). There was no significant interaction between LAR and evidence type, 
F(1, 46) = 0.07, p = .788. 
Non-Match Judgments 
 A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to investigate the effect of LAR and 
evidence type on number of correct non-match judgments made. There was no significant 
effect of LAR, F(1, 46) = 1.00, p = .753 on number of correct non-match judgments. 
However, as with match judgments, there was a significant effect of evidence type on 
non-match judgments, F(1, 46) = 18.06, p < .001 such that participants made more 
correct non-match judgments when judging fingerprint evidence (M = 1.07, SE = 0.10) 
than when judging footwear impression evidence (M = 0.57, SE = 0.12). There was no 
significant interaction between LAR and evidence type, F(1, 46) = 0.49, p = .489. 
Inconclusive Judgments 
A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to investigate the effect of LAR and 
evidence type on number of inconclusive judgments made. There was no significant 
effect of LAR on the number of inconclusive decisions made, F(1, 46) = 2.85, p = .089 
and no significant effect of evidence type, F(1, 46) = 3.99, p = .052. The interaction was 
also non-significant, F(1, 46) = 0.83, p = .368. 
Overall Accuracy Rate 
A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to investigate the effects of LAR and 
evidence type on participants’ overall accuracy rate. Although there was no significant 
effect of LAR on accuracy rate, F(1, 46) = 0.10, p = .753, it is important to note the 
successful shift in results compared to the preliminary findings reported above. 
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Specifically, changes to the LAR resulted in lower accuracy rates – albeit not 
significantly so - in participants who were presented with the biasing LAR (M = 0.39, SE 
= 0.07) than those presented with the blind LAR (M = 0.42, SE = .06), which was the 
opposite of what was found before changes were made. Unfortunately, due to time 
constraints and difficulties with participant recruitment, we were unable to collect more 
data, which may have increased power and thus rendered this difference statistically 
significant.  However, because we did see a change in the hypothesized direction of the 
effect the same LARs were used to manipulate contextual information in the Main Study. 
There was also a significant effect of evidence type, F(1, 46) = 18.06, p < .001, such that 
participants were significantly more accurate when judging fingerprint evidence (M = 
0.53, SE = 0.05) than when judging footwear impression evidence (M = 0.28, SD = 0.06). 
The interaction between LAR and evidence type was not significant, F(1, 46) = 0.49, p = 
.489.  
CHAPTER VI 
MAIN STUDY METHODS 
Design  
A 3 (Contextual Information: blind vs. non-blind vs. partially redacted) X 2 
(Examiner Experience: expert vs. novice) X 2 (Stimulus Material: footwear impression 
vs. fingerprint) X 2 (Stimulus Pair: match vs. non-match) mixed factorial design was 
employed with stimulus material and stimulus pair manipulated within participants.  
Participants 
Novice examiners were composed of undergraduate students from a large 
southeastern university. A total of 442 novices (N = 442) were recruited via the 
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university’s psychology research participation system in exchange for course credit. Of 
these participants, 155 participants were excluded because they did not pass the 
instructions quiz, they did not pass the LAR Questionnaire, and/or they did not allow us 
to use their data after being debriefed. The final sample of 287 novices (n = 287) was 
83.3% female (n = 239) and representative of the community from which they were 
drawn (70.4% Hispanic, 14.6% African American, 11.5% Caucasian, 1.4% Asian or 
Pacific Islander, 0.3% Native American or American Indian, and 1.4% Other). They 
ranged in age from 18 to 63 years (M = 22.85, SD = 5.89). One participant did not report 
their gender, age or ethnicity.   
Expert examiners were composed of latent fingerprint expert examiners from 
forensic laboratories across the United States. A total of 59 experts (N = 59) were 
recruited via multiple forensic laboratory email listservers, websites, and newsletters. Of 
these participants, four participants were excluded because they did not consent, did not 
pass the instructions quiz, did not pass the LAR Questionnaire, and/or they did not allow 
us to use their data after being debriefed. The final sample of 55 experts (n = 55) was 
mainly female (72.7%) and Caucasian (90.9%), followed by Hispanic (3.6%), Asian or 
Pacific Islander (1.8%), and Native American or American Indian (1.8%). One 
participant did not report their gender, age, or ethnicity. They ranged in age from 23 to 63 
years (M = 39.15, SD = 10.72) with an average number of 10.86 years of active casework 
experience (M = 10.86, SD = 9.06).  
Materials  
Fingerprint stimuli pairs. Each participant was presented with two of the four 
non-matching fingerprint pairs used in Pilot Study Two. The difficulty ratings of these 
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two non-matching fingerprint pairs were then used to select two matching fingerprint 
pairs to ensure that matching and non-matching fingerprint pairs had comparable 
difficulty levels. Thus, a total of four fingerprint pairs with similar (low) difficulty ratings 
were selected for stimulus generalization purposes. Prior to data collection, analyses were 
conducted to ensure that matching and non-matching fingerprint pairs did not differ in 
average difficulty rating. Results revealed that the fingerprints did not significantly differ 
from one another (all p > .05). 
Although fingerprint pairs selected for the Main Study were rated by experts as 
‘moderate to easy,’ it is important to note that, as shown by Pilot Study One results, 
students found these to be ‘difficult to moderate’ (no match fingerprint pairs were rated 
as ‘moderate to easy’ by students). Nonetheless, those chosen for the Main Study 
consisted of the pairs students rated as being the easiest of the ‘difficult to moderate’ 
category (MDifficulty = 4.30, SD = .90).  
Each participant was randomly presented with one matching and one non-
matching fingerprint pair from the final pool of fingerprints. Participants were only 
shown a total of two fingerprint pairs due to study material, design and procedures. That 
is, participants received an LAR describing the evidence collected at the crime scene and 
were told that only two fingerprints were collected and needed to be analyzed before 
being presented with the fingerprints.  
Footwear impression stimuli pairs. Similar to the fingerprint stimuli pairs, two 
of the four non-matching footwear impression pairs used in Pilot Study Two were 
randomly selected. The difficulty ratings of these two footwear impressions pairs were 
then used to select the two matching footwear impression pairs to ensure that both 
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matching and non-matching pairs selected had comparable difficulty levels. Thus, a total 
of four footwear impression pairs categorized as ‘moderate to easy’ were selected. 
Analyses were conducted to ensure that matching and non-matching footwear impression 
pairs did not differ in average difficulty rating. Results revealed that the footwear 
impression pairs’ difficulty rating did not significantly differ from one another (all p > 
.05). Given that the ability to compare the footwear impressions used in the proposed 
study was not expected to differ across levels of expertise, these stimuli were not piloted 
with forensic experts.   
Each participant was randomly presented with one matching and one non-
matching footwear impression pair from the final pool of two matching and two non-
matching footwear impressions. Participants were only presented with a total of two 
footwear impression pairs due to study material, design and procedures. That is, 
participants received an LAR describing the evidence collected at the crime scene and 
were told that only two footwear impressions had been collected at the crime scene and 
needed to be analyzed.  
General task instructions. Participants were provided with general instructions 
that provided them with information regarding the tasks they would be asked to complete. 
First, participants were told that they would be presented with evidence obtained from a 
real-world case and their job was to accurately analyze various pieces of forensic 
evidence. Participants were also told that before analyzing the forensic evidence, they 
would be presented with an LAR containing information about the case and evidence. 
Before being presented with the LAR, participants received a description of the forensic 
evidence and were told that they would be shown various prints, some of which would be 
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footwear impressions and others fingerprints. Further clarification was provided to 
participants by stating that they would be presented with footprint impressions and latent 
fingerprints that were collected at a crime scene along with their standards. Basic 
definitions for standard and latent prints were also provided to all participants. 
Participants were then instructed to compare each latent print (i.e., print collected at the 
crime scene) with its standard (i.e., known print collected directly from individual) and 
judge whether they were a match, non-match, or inconclusive. Similar to Pilot Study 
Two, a match was defined as a pair of prints originating from the same source (i.e., they 
came from the same person), a non-match was defined as prints originating from different 
sources (i.e., they came from different people), and an inconclusive decision was defined 
as prints having insufficient detail for a conclusive determination to be made (e.g., “I 
don’t know” response). 
Lab analysis request forms. The same blind and non-blind lab analysis request 
forms from Pilot Study Two were used for the present study in addition to a third version 
of the LAR. Thus, there were a total of three versions of the LAR in order to manipulate 
the amount of contextual information given to examiners and to examine the effect of 
redacting task-irrelevant information. Lab analysis request forms across all three 
experimental conditions were identical with the exception of the “Brief Case Summary” 
section. That is, the name of the lead investigator, the type of offense, information found 
in the routing table, etc. was included in all LARs. However, like in Pilot Study Two, the 
amount of available information about the case varied depending on each participants’ 
randomized condition. Specifically, participants in the ‘non-blind’ condition received all 
case details in the summary and those in the ‘blind’ condition were given a case summary 
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containing only the word “Routine.” The third version of the LAR was the ‘partially 
redacted’ condition in which participants received the same case summary as the non-
blind participants, but with task-irrelevant details redacted (i.e., blacked-out; see 
Appendix D). As suggested by various contextual information management procedures 
including the linear sequential unmasking procedure, only the critical and task-relevant 
details were available to participants. To decide which details should be redacted, a 
forensic expert, the Senior Police Bureau Commander of the MDFSB, was consulted to 
determine which details were absolutely necessary for examiners to know (see Appendix 
E for list of critical details). All other task-irrelevant details were redacted.  
Time 1 dependent measures.  After viewing each pair of prints, participants 
were asked to make a match, non-match or inconclusive judgment. A match judgment 
indicated that the two pieces of evidence shown originated from the same individual, 
whereas a non-match judgment indicated that the pair of evidence did not originate from 
the same individual. An inconclusive judgment was made if the participant felt that there 
was insufficient detail in the prints to make a conclusive decision. Participants were also 
asked to rate the confidence in their decision on a 7-point Likert scale with higher 
numbers indicating higher confidence.  
 LAR questionnaire. All participants received an LAR questionnaire to ensure 
they had understood the instructions provided to them and had read the LAR, thus also 
serving as a manipulation check questionnaire. Participants were asked questions 
regarding information they may or may not have been exposed to in the case summary 
(see Appendix F). All participants were first asked to write down everything they 
remembered about the information provided in the lab request form before answering a 
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series of multiple-choice questions. Participants were asked basic questions regarding the 
type of case summary they received and the evidence they were asked to analyze. Next, 
they were asked to answer questions regarding details of the crime that were consistent 
across the three versions of the LAR. Specifically, all participants received questions 
about the type of crime that occurred, how many suspects were involved, how many 
victims were involved, and what item was brought in as evidence. Answers across 
conditions were expected to be similar given that all LARs contained this information.  
Next, participants were asked multiple-choice questions regarding specific 
information that may or may not have been available in the case summary depending on 
the condition they were assigned to. Specifically, they were asked questions about where 
the victim was coming from, where the crime took place, what the suspects demanded 
from the victim, what weapon was used, what item was taken from the victim, where the 
car was parked, and how many suspects were in custody. Participants were also presented 
with various options including an “Information not given” response, which would be the 
correct answer for the specific questions that asked about pieces of information that were 
unavailable to participants in the partially redacted and blind conditions.  
Time 2 dependent measures. After being presented with an LAR containing all 
information at Time 2 (see procedure), participants were asked if they would like to 
change any of the previous decisions they made concerning the pieces of evidence they 
analyzed. If they indicated that they would like to change any of their initial decisions, 
they were asked to judge the same pieces of evidence a second time and make a match, 
non-match or inconclusive decision. If they decided to change their initial decision, they 
were also asked to provide an explanation as to why they decided to make the change.  
56 
 
 Perceptions questionnaire. Participants were also presented with a questionnaire 
that was used to gauge their overall perception of the evidence, the LAR and their 
experience participating in the study (see Appendix G). They were first asked to rate how 
accurate they believed they were in analyzing the different pieces of evidence on a scale 
from 0 – 100% and were also asked to rate how guilty they believed each suspect was on 
a scale from 1 (definitely innocent) to 10 (definitely guilty). In addition, depending on 
what condition they were assigned to, they answered questions about whether they 
thought the case summary provided sufficient information to make accurate decisions and 
whether they thought they would have been influenced by having additional information 
about the case. Finally, they were asked what type of LAR they preferred to have when 
analyzing forensic evidence.  
Demographics questionnaire. Participants were also asked basic demographic 
questions regarding their age, gender, ethnicity, education, and occupation (see Appendix 
H). Forensic experts were asked additional questions about their work experience as 
forensic latent fingerprint examiners. Specifically, experts were asked about the numbers 
of years of active casework experience they had completed, the type of law enforcement 
agency they were currently employed by, whether they examine other types of forensic 
evidence in addition to latent print examinations, and the type and duration of any 
structured latent fingerprint training program they had received.  
Debriefing script. The debriefing script informed participants of the true nature 
of the experiment after participants completed the experiment and provided them with the 
contact information of the researchers in charge of the study. They were also given the 
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opportunity to deny the use of their data for final analyses after reading the debriefing 
script.  
Procedure 
For recruiting purposes, participants were told that the study consisted of 
examining various pieces of forensic evidence that were taken from a real-world criminal 
case. Participants were under the impression that the main purpose of the study was to 
examine the importance of piloting materials (e.g., case reports, lab analysis request 
forms, and pieces of forensic evidence) used for routine proficiency testing of forensic 
scientists. However, after the collection of the first 14 expert examiners, it was suggested 
that recruitment would not go well with the existing “cover story” because of examiners’ 
expected skepticism regarding the materials being part of existing proficiency exams. 
They were expected to be skeptical because of their experience with professionally 
distributed proficiency exams. Thus, the wording used for recruitment purposes was 
made more general such that participants were instead told that the purpose of the current 
study was simply to examine the importance of testing stimulus materials (e.g., police 
case reports, evidence submission forms, and pieces of forensic evidence). The only 
changes made were the deletion of the “proficiency testing” wording. This change was 
implemented after having collected 14 expert participants and 189 student participants. 
We do not believe that this change in recruitment wording had an effect on student 
participants performance, given that when asked what they believed the study was about, 
only one of the 189 students recalled that the purpose of the experiment had something to 
do with testing materials for proficiency exams suggesting students did not pay much 
attention to the cover story.  
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Once participants decided to participate in the study, they were provided with a 
Qualtrics survey link and brief instructions stating that they would have as much time as 
they need to complete the study. However, they were also told that the study was to be 
completed in one sitting. All study procedures were administered via the university’s 
online Qualtrics survey program. Novices (i.e., undergraduate students) were provided 
with the survey link via SONA systems in order to receive credit for participating, 
whereas experts were emailed the link to the survey or clicked on the survey link if it 
appeared on a laboratories’ website or newsletter. All participants completed the online 
study alone and on their own time. 
After online consent was obtained, participants received the general task 
instructions regarding the specific tasks they would be asked to complete. Once 
participants finished reading the instructions, they were asked to take a quiz about the 
instructions they had just read. After the completion of the instructions quiz, participants 
were randomly presented with one of the three LARs, either containing all contextual 
information, partially redacted contextual information, or no contextual information. 
Following the LAR, participants were randomly presented with either the first pair of 
footwear impressions or fingerprints, randomly assigned to be either a match or non-
match. Participants were allowed to refer back to the LAR as many times as needed while 
comparing the prints. Once they judged the first pair of prints as a match, non-match, or 
inconclusive, they were asked to indicate the confidence in their judgment. Next, 
participants were randomly presented with one of the other three remaining pieces of 
evidence (a total of two fingerprints and two footwear impressions).   
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After analyzing the two pairs of fingerprints (one match and one non-match) and 
two pairs of footwear impressions (one match and one non-match), all participants were 
presented with the LAR questionnaire. After completion of the LAR questionnaire, all 
participants received the non-blind LAR, regardless of the LAR condition they were 
originally assigned to. After reading the non-blind LAR, participants were asked if they 
would like to change any of their initial decisions. Participants who answered “Yes” to 
this question were presented with the four pieces of evidence for a second time along 
with a reminder of their prior decision. Every time they changed their initial decision, 
they were asked to provide an explanation as to why they decided to change their match, 
non-match or inconclusive decision. This was done to mirror proposed linear sequential 
unmasking procedures. After participants finished re-analyzing the evidence, they were 
provided with the perceptions questionnaire and finished the study by completing the 
demographics questionnaire. Participants who answered “No” when asked if they would 
like to change any of their initial decisions were instead taken directly to the perceptions 
questionnaire. Once participants finished answering the demographics questionnaire, they 
were debriefed and thanked for their time.  
Coding of Outcome Variables 
 Time 1 judgements. Time 1 judgements are those participants made prior to 
being exposed to the second, complete LAR and are thus comprised of two fingerprint 
pair judgements and two footwear impression pair judgements. Fingerprint and footwear 
impression judgments were coded as correct, incorrect, or inconclusive. A decision was 
scored as correct when a participant judged a pair of matching stimuli as matches (i.e., 
correct identification) or a pair of non-matching stimuli as non-matches (i.e., correct 
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exclusion). A decision was scored as incorrect when a participant incorrectly judged a 
pair of matching stimuli as non-matches (i.e., incorrect exclusion) or a pair of non-
matching stimuli as matches (i.e., false identification). In line with previous research, 
inconclusive decisions were not coded as correct or incorrect (Kerstholt et al., 2010; 
Langenburg, Champod, & Wertheim, 2009), but were instead coded separately. Overall 
accuracy was also calculated and was defined as the proportion of judgements made 
accurately. It was calculated by dividing the total number of correct judgments made 
(correct identifications and correct exclusions) by the total number of judgments made.  
A signal detection approach was also used to determine how well examiners 
discriminated between matching and non-matching pairs of evidence (i.e., discrimination 
accuracy) and whether there were differences in examiners’ tendency to respond (i.e., 
response bias). Discrimination accuracy (d՛) was calculated by subtracting the z-score of 
false IDs from the z-score of correct IDs. Response bias (c) was calculated by adding the 
z-score of correct IDs and the z-score of False IDs, multiplying the outcome by negative 
one, and dividing it by two.  
 Time 2 judgments. Participants were asked whether they would like to re-
analyze the evidence after being exposed to the non-blind LAR case summary 
information, which contained a complete case summary. For individuals who decided to 
change their Time 1 judgments, their Time 2 judgements were coded for the type of 
change that was made. A correct change, for example, was one in which the participant 
either a) incorrectly judged a matching pair of stimuli as non-matching or inconclusive at 
Time 1 and changed their decision to matching or b) incorrectly judged a non-matching 
pair of stimuli as matching or inconclusive at Time 1 and changed their decision to non-
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matching. An incorrect change, on the other hand, was one in which the participant either 
a) correctly judged a pair of matching stimuli as matches at Time 1 and changed their 
decision to non-matching or inconclusive or b) correctly judged a pair of non-matching 
stimuli as non-matches at Time 1 and changed their decision to matching or inconclusive.  
CHAPTER VII 
MAIN STUDY RESULTS 
Time 1 Judgements 
Separate logistic regressions were conducted to examine the effects of contextual 
information condition and examiner experience on the likelihood of making a correct 
fingerprint ID, correct footwear impression ID, incorrect fingerprint exclusion, incorrect 
footwear impression exclusion, correct fingerprint exclusion, correct footwear impression 
exclusion, false fingerprint ID, and false footwear impression ID at Time 1. In addition, a 
mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to examine the effect of contextual 
information condition, examiner experience, stimulus material, and stimulus pair on the 
number of inconclusive judgments made at Time 1. Contextual information was dummy 
coded for logistic regression analyses. First, the blind LAR was selected as the reference 
group in order to obtain the following comparisons: blind LAR versus non-blind LAR 
and blind LAR versus partially redacted LAR. Next, the partially redacted LAR was 
selected as the reference group in order to obtain the last comparison between partially 
redacted LAR and non-blind LAR.  
Correct fingerprint ID. A logistic regression was conducted to examine the 
effect of contextual information condition and examiner experience on the likelihood of 
making a correct fingerprint ID (see Table 1). There was a significant effect of 
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experience, B = 2.50, Wald = 16.93, p < .001, OR = 12.15, 95% CI for OR = 3.70 to 
39.90. Experts were more than 12 times more likely to make a correct fingerprint ID than 
novice examiners (see Table 2). However, there was no significant effect of contextual 
information on the likelihood of making a correct fingerprint ID such that those who 
received the blind LAR did not significantly differ from those who received the non-blind 
LAR or from examiners who received a redacted LAR. In addition, participants who 
received the non-blind LAR did not significantly differ from those who received the 
redacted LAR. There was also no significant interaction between experience and 
contextual information. 
Correct footwear impression ID. A logistic regression was conducted to 
examine the effect of contextual information and examiner experience on the likelihood 
of making a correct footwear impression ID (see Table 3). There was a significant effect 
of experience, B = -1.88, Wald = 19.51, p < .001, OR = 0.15, 95% CI for OR = 0.07 to 
0.35 such that, interestingly, novices were approximately 7 times more likely to make a 
correct footwear impression ID than expert examiners (see Table 2). There was no 
significant effect of contextual information on the likelihood of making a correct 
footwear impression ID such that the different LAR conditions did not significantly differ 
from one another. There was also no significant interaction between experience and 
contextual information. 
Incorrect fingerprint exclusion. A logistic regression was conducted to examine 
the effect of contextual information and examiner experience on the likelihood of making 
an incorrect fingerprint exclusion (see Table 4). There was a significant effect of 
experience, B = -2.82, Wald = 7.65, p = .006, OR = 0.06, 95% CI for OR = 0.01 to 0.44. 
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Novices were approximately 17 times more likely than expert examiners to make an 
incorrect fingerprint exclusion (see Table 2). Again, there was no significant effect of 
contextual information such that regardless of the LAR the examiners received, there 
were no differences in their likelihood of making an incorrect fingerprint exclusion. 
There was also no significant interaction between experience and contextual information. 
Incorrect footwear impression exclusion. A logistic regression was conducted 
to examine the effects of contextual information and examiner experience on the 
likelihood of making an incorrect footwear impression exclusion (see Table 5). There 
was no significant effect of experience meaning experts and novices were equally likely 
to make an incorrect footwear impression exclusion. There was also no significant effect 
of contextual information such that examiners in the different LAR conditions did not 
significantly differ from one another. There was also no significant interaction between 
experience and contextual information. 
Correct fingerprint exclusion. A logistic regression was conducted to examine 
the effect of contextual information and examiner experience on the likelihood of making 
a correct fingerprint exclusion (see Table 6). There was a significant effect of experience, 
B = 2.65, Wald = 19.17, p < .001, OR = 14.19, 95% CI for OR = 4.33 to 46.55 such that 
expert examiners were approximately 14 times more likely to make a correct fingerprint 
exclusion than novice examiners (see Table 2). There was no significant effect of 
contextual information on the likelihood of making a correct fingerprint exclusion such 
that examiners in the different LAR conditions did not significantly differ from one 
another. There was also no significant interaction between experience and contextual 
information. 
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Correct footwear impression exclusion. A logistic regression was conducted to 
examine the effect of contextual information and examiner experience on the likelihood 
of making a correct footwear impression exclusion (see Table 7). There was no 
significant effect of experience or of contextual information. Specifically, experts did not 
differ from novices and those who received the blind LAR did not significantly differ 
from those who received the non-blind LAR or from the redacted LAR. Those who 
received the non-blind LAR also did not significantly differ from those who received the 
redacted LAR. However, there was a significant interaction between experience and 
contextual information, B = -0.78, Wald = 4.12, p = .043, OR = 0.46, 95% CI for OR = 
0.22 to 0.98. Follow up analyses found that only for expert examiners, did receiving a 
blind LAR result in a marginally significant increase in the likelihood of making a correct 
footwear impression exclusion, B = 1.31, Wald = 3.67, p = .056, OR = 3.71, 95% CI for 
OR = 0.97 to 14.23. Specifically, experts who were presented with a blind LAR were 
3.71 times more likely to make a correct footwear impression exclusion than experts who 
were presented with a redacted LAR. However, this finding should be interpreted with 
extreme caution, as it may be a type 1 error.  
False fingerprint ID. A logistic regression was conducted to examine the effects 
of contextual information and examiner experience on the likelihood of making a false 
fingerprint ID (see Table 8). There was no significant effect of experience or of 
contextual information on the likelihood of making a false fingerprint ID. That is, experts 
and novices did not differ from one another and examiners in the different LAR 
conditions also did not significantly differ from one another. There was also no 
significant interaction between experience and contextual information. 
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False footwear impression ID. A logistic regression was conducted to examine 
the effect of contextual information and examiner experience on the likelihood of making 
a false footwear impression ID (see Table 9). There was a significant effect of 
experience, B = -2.87, Wald = 7.92, p = .005, OR = 0.06, 95% CI for OR = 0.01 to 0.42. 
Novice examiners were approximately 17 times more likely to make a false footwear 
impression ID than expert examiners (see Table 2). However, there was no significant 
effect of contextual information on the likelihood of making a false footwear impression 
ID. There was also no significant interaction between experience and contextual 
information. 
Inconclusive judgments. Regardless of the stimulus material individuals judged 
(i.e., fingerprints or footwear impressions) or whether each pair was a match or non-
match, participants’ were able to make an “inconclusive” judgement. Thus, a participant 
could have made a total of one, two, three or four inconclusive judgments. A mixed 
ANOVA was conducted to examine the effect of contextual information, examiner 
experience, stimulus material, and stimulus pair on the total number of inconclusive 
judgments made (see Table 10).  
There was a significant effect of stimulus material, F(1, 336) = 9.50, p = .002, 𝜂𝑝
2 
= .027. Examiners made more inconclusive judgments when judging footwear 
impressions (M = 0.50, SE = 0.04) than when judging fingerprints (M = 0.33, SE = 0.04). 
However, this main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between examiner 
experience and stimulus material, F(1, 336) = 60.71, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .153, for the number 
of inconclusive decisions made. Follow up independent sample t-tests revealed that 
experience had a different effect on the number of inconclusive decisions made 
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depending on whether the evidence analyzed was a fingerprint or a footwear impression 
(see Figure 3). Specifically, experts made significantly more inconclusive decisions (M = 
0.71, SD = 0.63) than novices (M = 0.30, SD = 0.49) when judging footwear impression 
evidence, t(67.04) = -4.57, p < .001, d = 0.73, 95% CI (-0.59, -0.23), but experts made 
significantly fewer inconclusive decisions (M = 0.09, SD = 0.29) than novice examiners 
(M = 0.56, SD = 0.63) when judging fingerprint evidence, t(168.57) = 8.79, p < .001, d = 
0.96, 95% CI (0.37, 0.58).  
There was also a significant effect of stimulus pair, F(1, 336) = 48.72, p < .001, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .127, such that participants made more inconclusive decisions when judging non-
matching pairs of stimuli (M = 0.61, SE = 0.05) than when judging matching pairs of 
evidence (M = 0.22, SE = 0.03). There was a significant interaction between stimulus pair 
and contextual information, F(1, 336) = 3.93, p = .048, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .012. However this two-way 
interaction was qualified by a three-way interaction between examiner experience, 
contextual information, and stimulus pair on the number of inconclusive judgements 
made, F(1, 336) = 4.02, p = .019, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .023. Follow-up independent sample t-tests 
revealed that only when examiners were provided with a Blind LAR, did novice 
examiners make marginally significantly more inconclusive judgements (M = 0.74, SD = 
0.74) compared to expert examiners (M = 0.37, SD = 0.50), t(107) = 1.92, p = .056, d = 
0.59, 95% CI (-0.01, 0.75) when judging non-matching pairs of evidence. There were no 
other significant interactions.  
Accuracy rate. A mixed ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of 
contextual information, examiner experience, stimulus material, and stimulus pair on 
examiners’ accuracy rate (see Table 11). As mentioned above, accuracy rate was 
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calculated by dividing the total number of correct decisions made, by the number of 
decisions made in total. There was a significant main effect of examiner experience, F(1, 
336) = 20.82, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .058, such that expert examiners were significantly more 
accurate (M = 0.79, SE = 0.03) than novice examiners (M = 0.64, SE = 0.01). However, 
this main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between examiner experience 
and stimulus material, F(1, 336) = 48.20, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.125 (see Figure 4). Follow up 
independent sample t-tests revealed that examiner experience only had a significant effect 
on fingerprint accuracy rates, t(182.88) = -12.44, p < .001, d = 1.36, 95% CI (-0.43, -
0.31) and not on footwear impression accuracy rates. Specifically, experts were 
significantly more accurate (M = 0.95, SD = 0.16) when judging fingerprint pairs than 
novice examiners (M = 0.57, SD = 0.36). There was also a significant effect of stimulus 
pair, F(1, 336) = 35.28, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .095. Both expert and novice examiners were 
significantly more accurate when judging matching pairs of stimuli (M = 0.81, SE = 0.02) 
than when judging non-matching pairs of stimuli (M = 0.62, SE = 0.03). There were no 
other significant main effects or interactions. 
Signal Detection Measures  
 Discrimination accuracy. A mixed ANOVA was conducted to examine the 
effects of contextual information, examiner experience, and stimulus material on d՛ (i.e., 
discrimination accuracy) (see Table 12). A discrimination accuracy d՛ value may range 
from +∞ to -∞. A score of zero indicates an inability to distinguish between matches and 
non-matches, whereas larger values indicate a greater ability to distinguish matches from 
non-matches. 
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 There was a significant main effect of examiner experience, F(1, 335) = 8.14, p = 
.005, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .024, such that experts were better able to discriminate between matching and 
non-matching pairs of stimuli (M = 0.34, SE = 0.13) compared to novices (M = -0.06, SE 
= 0.06). There was also a significant main effect of evidence material, F(1, 335) = 7.59, p 
= .006, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .022. Both expert and novice examiners were better able to discriminate 
between matching and non-matching fingerprints (M = 0.34, SE = 0.11) than matching 
and non-matching footwear impressions (M = -0.07, SE = 0.10). There was also a 
significant interaction between experience and stimulus material, F(1, 335) = 16.18, p < 
.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .046. Follow up independent t-tests revealed that experience only had a 
significant effect on fingerprint (and not footwear impression evidence) discrimination 
accuracy, t(261.74) = -9.04, d = 0.89, p < .001, 95% CI (-1.22, -0.78) such that experts 
were better able to discriminate between matching and non-matching fingerprints (M = 
0.84, SD = 0.48) compared to novices (M = -0.16, SD = 1.51; see Figure 5). There were 
no other significant main effects or interactions. 
 Response bias. A mixed ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of 
contextual information, examiner experience, and stimulus material on c (i.e., response 
bias) (see Table 13). Negative values of c signify a bias towards responding “match”, 
whereas positive values signify a bias towards the “non-match” response. The neutral 
point of c is 0, which indicates a neutral judgment tendency such that there is no greater 
tendency to respond with a match or non-match response.  
There was a significant main effect of examiner experience, F(1, 335) = 7.30, p = 
.007, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .021. Expert examiners were more likely to make a non-match decision 
regardless of whether the prints were matches or non-matches (M = 0.18, SE = 0.07) 
69 
 
compared to novices (M = -0.03, SE = 0.03). There was also a significant main effect of 
evidence material, F(1, 335) = 19.55, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .055. Examiners were more likely to 
make a non-match decision when judging footwear impressions (M = 0.23, SE = 0.05) 
compared to when judging fingerprints (M = -0.08, SE = 0.05). There was also a 
significant interaction between examiner experience and stimulus material, F(1, 335) = 
41.50, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .110. Follow up independent t-tests revealed that examiner 
experience had a significant effect on response bias when judging fingerprint evidence, 
t(257.65) = 4.32, p < .001, d = 0.42, 95% CI (0.13, 0.34) such that experts appeared to 
have a “match” bias when judging fingerprints (M = -0.19, SD = 0.24) whereas novices 
demonstrated more of a “non-match” bias (M = 0.04, SD = 0.74). However, opposite 
findings were found when judging footwear impression evidence, t(68.86) = -5.63, p < 
.001, d = 0.87, 95% CI (-0.87, -0.42), such that experts tended to have a “non-match” bias 
(M = 0.54, SD = 0.79) whereas novices showed more of a “match” bias (M = -0.10, SD = 
0.68). There were no other significant main effects or interactions. 
Confidence Ratings  
A mixed ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of LAR condition, 
examiner experience, stimulus material, and stimulus pair on examiners’ confidence 
ratings (see Table 14). There was a significant effect of examiner experience, F(1, 336) = 
5.35, p = .021, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.016, such that experts reported feeling more confident in their 
judgements (M = 5.75, SE = 0.13) than novices (M = 5.43, SE = 0.06). There was also a 
significant effect of stimulus material, F(1, 336) = 16.15, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .046. Examiners 
reported feeling more confident in their fingerprint judgements (M = 5.78, SE = 0.09) 
than in their footwear impression judgments (M = 5.40, SE = 0.08). However, these main 
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effects were qualified by a significant interaction between examiner experience and 
stimulus material, F(1, 336) = 152.05, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.312 (see Figure 6). Specifically, 
experts reported feeling significantly more confident (M = 6.53, SD = 0.75) than novices 
(M = 5.03, SD = 1.28) when judging fingerprints t(123.39) = -11.81, p < .001, d = 1.43, 
95% CI (-1.75, -1.25), but reported feeling significantly less confident (M = 4.96, SD = 
1.38) than novices (M = 5.83, SD = 0.97) when judging footwear impression evidence, 
t(64.57) = 4.42, p < .001, d = 0.73, 95% CI = 0.47, 1.25).  
In addition, there was a significant main effect of stimulus pair, F(1, 336) = 27.17, 
p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.075, such that examiners reported feeling more confident when judging 
matches (M = 5.80, SE = 0.07) than when judging non-matches (M = 5.38, SE = 0.09). 
This main effect was qualified by a significant interaction between examiner experience 
and stimulus pair, F(1, 336) = 3.96, p = .047, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 0.012. Specifically, examiner 
experience only had a significant effect on examiners’ confidence ratings when analyzing 
non-matching pairs of evidence, t(340) = -2.75, p = .006, d = 0.41, 95% CI (-0.40, -0.07), 
such that expert examiners felt significantly more confident when judging non-matching 
pairs of evidence (M = 5.61, SD = 1.06) than novices (M = 5.14, SD = 1.19). There were 
no other significant main effects or interactions.  
Finally, bivariate correlations were conducted to examiner the relationship 
between individuals’ confidence ratings and their accuracy rate. Analyses revealed a 
significant and positive correlation between accuracy rate and confidence, r = .150, p = 
.005, such that the more confident individuals felt in their judgments, the more likely they 
were to be accurate. Additional exploratory analyses revealed that the positive correlation 
between accuracy and confidence was present regardless of the type of stimuli material 
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and stimuli pair examiners analyzed (see Table 15). However, there was only a 
significant accuracy-confidence correlation present for participants who viewed the non-
blind LAR, r = .246, p = .007, and not for those who were given a blind LAR, r = .088, p 
= .364, or a redacted LAR, r = .093, p = .322. In addition, the there was a marginally 
positive correlation between accuracy and confidence for novice examiners, r = .114, p = 
.053, but not for expert examiners, r = .200, p = .143.  
Time 2 Judgments 
Decision to review time 1 judgments. A logistic regression was conducted to 
examine the effect contextual information and examiner experience had on examiner’s 
decision to go back and review their Time 1 judgments after being presented with an 
LAR that had all case summary details (see Table 16). There was only a significant effect 
of examiner experience, B = -2.18, Wald = 12.95, p < .001, OR = 0.11, 95% CI for OR = 
0.03 to 0.37. Novices were more than 9 times more likely than expert examiners to decide 
that they wanted to go back to their original responses and make changes. There were no 
other significant main effects or interactions. Specifically, only three forensic experts 
decided to go back to review their Time 1 judgments, whereas 97 novice examiners 
decided to go back to their Time 1 judgments.  
Correct and incorrect changes made. Of those participants who decided to go 
back to their original responses and make changes (n = 100, 29.2%), a total of 17% made 
at least one correct change to their initial response. However, 14% of participants who 
decided to go back to their responses after being presented with the non-blind LAR were 
incorrect in at least one of the changes they made. The remaining participants (69%), 
which included the three expert examiners who decided to review their Time 1 
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judgments, did not decide to change any of their initial decisions after being reminded of 
their initial judgments.  
Incorrect match decisions made. Of particular importance to the current study are 
the incorrect changes examiners made when they changed their initial correct non-match 
decision or inconclusive decision to an incorrect match decision after being exposed to 
new biasing information (i.e., suspects are in custody) as it suggests they were influenced 
by such information. Overall, 11% of participants who decided to change their initial 
decision made an incorrect match decision after being exposed to additional case 
summary details.  
Perceptions Questionnaire 
 Examiners were provided with various questions regarding how well they 
performed on the given tasks and their opinions regarding how guilty they found each 
suspect to be and whether they felt the initial LAR they received provided them with 
enough information to accurately analyze the evidence. In order to better understand how 
contextual information and experience can affect such beliefs, separate univariate 
ANOVAs were conducted on participants’ self-reported accuracy and each suspect’s guilt 
ratings. Furthermore, a logistic regression was conducted on examiners’ belief on 
whether or not the initial LAR they received provided them with sufficient information.  
Self-reported accuracy. Overall, there was a significant effect of examiner 
experience on participants’ self-reported accuracy, F(1, 336) = 60.72, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .153. 
Experts reported being more accurate in their judgments (M = 91.12, SE = 2.94) than 
novice examiners (M = 66.10, SD = 1.28).  However, there was no significant effect of 
contextual information, nor was the interaction significant. 
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Guilt ratings. A similar pattern of findings was found for examiners’ guilt ratings 
for both suspects. Specifically, there was only a significant effect of examiner experience, 
such that expert examiners reported lower guilt ratings for suspect #1 (M = 5.32, SE = 
0.29) than novices (M = 7.03, SE = 0.13) and for suspect #2 (M = 5.21, SE = 0.27, M = 
7.39, SE = 0.16, respectively). This was supported by expert examiners’ comments 
regarding their beliefs about the suspects’ guilt. Many expert examiners explicitly stated 
it was not their place to determine whether a suspect was guilty or innocent.  
Perceptions of information available. There was a significant main effect of 
examiner experience on examiners’ belief regarding whether they had sufficient 
information on their initial LAR to make accurate decisions about the various pieces of 
evidence, B = 2.19, Wald = 16.77, p < .001, OR = 8.97, 95% CI for OR = 3.14 to 25.64. 
Experts were approximately nine times more likely to believe they had sufficient 
information on their LAR compared to novice examiners. There was also a significant 
effect of contextual information, such that those examiners who received the non-blind 
LAR were more likely to believe they had sufficient information to make accurate 
decisions, compared to examiners who received a blind LAR, B = 0.64, Wald = 4.68, p = 
.030, OR = 1.91, 95% CI for OR = 1.06 to 3.41 and also compared to those who received 
a partially redacted LAR, B = 0.82, Wald = 7.80, p = .005, OR = 2.27, 95% CI for OR = 
1.28 to 4.04. However, there was no significant differences between those who received a 
blind LAR and a partially redacted LAR, B = 0.18, Wald = 0.38, p = .537, OR = 1.19, 
95% CI for OR = 0.68 to 2.09. There was no significant interaction between examiner 
experience and contextual information.   
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CHAPTER VIII 
DISCUSSION 
 The present study was the first to examine the effects of contextual bias, 
examiner experience, and stimulus material on examiners’ analyses of forensic evidence. 
Specifically, the study examined how differential exposure to case details about a crime 
can affect examiners’ analyses of forensic evidence. In doing so, we were able to test the 
efficacy of blind testing and linear sequential unmasking methods (i.e., redacting task-
irrelevant information), which are two of the most commonly recommended bias-
reducing procedures (Kassin et al., 2013; Saks et al., 2003). In addition, the effect of 
examiner experience and stimulus material on examiners’ analyses were investigated to 
address some of the concerns voiced by practitioners regarding the limitations of existing 
research, including inexperienced student participants analyzing forensic evidence 
samples that require specialized training.  
Contextual Information 
The first aim of the present study was to examine the effects of contextual bias on 
examiners’ evaluation of forensic evidence by varying the amount of pre-comparison 
information available to participants while simultaneously testing the efficacy of various 
bias-reducing procedures. We hypothesized there would be an effect of contextual 
information such that examiners who received a complete, non-blind LAR prior to 
conducting analyses and thus had biasing information (e.g., suspects’ criminal history and 
custody status) would be more likely to make a match decision (correct and incorrect) 
compared to examiners who received the blind or partially redacted LAR. Furthermore, it 
was predicted that examiners who received the partially redacted LAR would be more 
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likely to make a correct ID and less likely to make a false ID and thus have better 
discrimination accuracy than examiners who received the blind LAR. However, results 
did not support our hypotheses regarding contextual bias. Instead, findings revealed no 
differences between the three contextual information conditions on examiners’ judgments 
and thus no differences in their overall accuracy, discrimination accuracy, or response 
tendencies. As such, the current findings do not support that recommended blinding and 
redaction procedures (Kassin, Dror, Kukucka, 2013) can reduce the broad effect of bias 
on examiners’ forensic analyses under the conditions measured, but this may be because 
there was no effect of bias found. 
Nonetheless, the present findings mirror those found by Kerstholt and colleagues 
(2007 & 2010) who also did not find an effect of contextual bias. Kerstholt and 
colleagues (2007) included real-world police officers whom had been trained on footwear 
impression analyses whereas Kertsholt and colleagues (2010) included forensic firearm 
examiners as participants. Specifically, Kerstholt and colleagues’ (2007) found that 
providing police officers with additional guilt presumptive contextual information about 
suspects in a hypothetical case did not affect their analyses of footwear impression 
evidence. Kerstoholt and colleagues’ (2010) also found that providing firearm examiners 
with either neutral or biasing information about the number of individuals implicated in 
the crime did not affect examiners’ decision regarding whether a set of bullets came from 
the same or different firearm. Similarly, present results found that telling real-world 
forensic examiners and student participants that the suspects were in custody and 
providing them with information about the suspects’ criminal history did not bias their 
analyses.  
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Differences in contextual bias across studies may be explained by differences in 
the types of biasing details available to examiners. Examiners may be affected less by 
peripheral information including a suspect’s criminal history or custody status and more 
influenced by information that more directly incriminates the suspect. For example, as 
previous research has found, telling forensic examiners that the suspect confessed, more 
directly associates a particular suspect with the crime being investigated and may thus 
more easily affect a forensic examiner’s analyses (Kukucka & Kassin, 2014). In this case, 
using a blinding procedure or redaction methods may be useful in decreasing the negative 
effect of contextual bias – an important notion for research moving forward. 
Another possible explanation why the contextual information, regardless of its 
availability and content, did not impact examiners’ judgments of the evidence is that 
examiners felt particularly inclined to perform well and treat the analyses as they would 
in a real-world case because of the manner in which the information was relayed to them. 
Specifically, in the current study examiners were presented with a realistic LAR that 
mimicked the form used by the Miami Dade Forensic Services Bureau. Using these 
evidence submission forms to manipulate the availability of contextual information 
differs from past research, in which examiners are generally provided with a case 
summary in the form of a simple paragraph – outside the context of a LAR. Providing 
examiners with an official looking document may have led them to assume the role of a 
forensic examiner working a real case and thus pay closer attention to study materials and 
procedures, decreasing any potential effect of bias when the task-irrelevant information 
was available.  
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Moreover, it was hypothesized that due to the lack of information, participants in 
the blind condition would be less confident in their analyses compared to participants 
who received either all the information about the case or a partially redacted LAR. 
However, there were no differences in examiners’ confidence ratings depending on the 
contextual information condition they were in. This may be because examiners did not 
base their confidence ratings on the amount and type of information available to them on 
the LAR, but instead on other factors such as their experience with analyzing different 
types of forensic evidence. Indeed, the present results found a significant interaction 
between examiner experience and stimulus material, such that expert fingerprints 
examiners felt significantly more confident in their fingerprint judgments than novices. 
Interestingly, novices felt significantly more confident in their footwear impression 
judgments compared to experts. This may be because expert examiners recruited for this 
study were primarily expert latent fingerprint experts who may have had only a small 
amount of experience analyzing footwear impressions and were aware of this differential 
experience (unlike student participants who were inexperienced in examining both type 
of stimuli). It appears that expert fingerprint examiners adjusted their confidence 
judgments accordingly depending on the evidence they were analyzing such that they 
were more confident conducting analyses they had more experience with (i.e., 
fingerprints) and less confident when judging evidence they were not too familiar with 
(i.e., footwear impressions).   
Exploratory analyses also revealed that examiners who received the non-blind 
LAR were more likely to believe they had sufficient information to conduct accurate 
analyses compared to examiners who received a blind or partially redacted LAR. 
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Interestingly, there were no differences in accuracy rates among the various conditions, 
which indicates that although examiners may feel they do not have sufficient information 
about the case when given blind or partially redacted LARs to perform well, they are still 
capable of performing just as well as those who do have all case details.  
Examiner Experience 
 The majority of past research examining the effects of contextual bias on forensic 
analyses have used undergraduate, untrained student participants (Dror et al., 2005; 
Smalarz et al., 2016). The use of undergraduate students is one of the most common 
critiques practitioners in the field have of past research and they often struggle to accept 
findings from such studies, stating they cannot be generalized to experts in the field 
(Ostrom, 2009). For this reason, the second primary aim of the present study was to 
directly compare novice and expert examiners’ vulnerabilities to contextual bias and their 
ability to conduct forensic analyses. Overall, it was hypothesized that novices would 
make more mistakes than expert examiners (i.e., less likely to make correct IDs and 
correct exclusions and more likely to make false IDs and incorrect exclusions) and have 
poorer discrimination accuracy because of their lack of experience in analyzing 
fingerprint and footwear impression evidence. Findings of the present study supported 
this hypothesis such that novices tended to perform worse than expert forensic examiners. 
For example, novices were less likely to make correct fingerprint and footwear 
impression IDs, more likely to make false footwear impression IDs, and had worse 
overall accuracy and discrimination accuracy compared to expert examiners.  
 Furthermore, an interaction between examiner experience and contextual 
information was predicted such that task-irrelevant information was believed to influence 
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novice examiners more so than expert examiners. On the basis of past research 
suggesting that differences in examiners’ susceptibility to bias can depend on the level of 
experience with conducting fingerprint evidence analyses (Langenburg et al., 2009), 
examiners with no experience analyzing forensic evidence were expected to rely more on 
the contextual information when available (i.e., non-blind LAR condition) compared to 
expert examiners. That is, novice examiners would be more influenced than experts by 
task-irrelevant information because of the increased unfamiliarity and difficulty of the 
task at hand. However, an interaction between examiner experience and contextual 
information was not found.  This lack of predicted finding may also be explained in line 
with earlier discussing of the role of stimulus material in this effect:  The type of task-
irrelevant and biasing information provided to examiners may not have been sufficiently 
biasing to allow examiners to rely on such information when it was available even when 
the examiner had no experience in conducting forensic analyses. In the context of real-
world forensic examiners’ criticism of prior research however, this lack of interaction 
cautiously suggests that using lay examiners may not necessarily overestimate the 
potential for cognitive bias per se as student examiners did not showcase a heightened 
vulnerability to prior case information compared to expert examiners. However, given 
that there was no main effect of prior case information contained in LARs, future 
research needs to urgently address potential differences in vulnerability to cognitive bias 
in forensic examination between experts and novices when such bias does exist. 
Although an interaction between examiner experience and contextual information 
was not supported by the present findings, there was a significant interaction between 
examiner experience and stimulus material, as predicted. Experts were expected to 
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perform significantly better than novices, but only when analyzing fingerprint evidence 
because it requires more specialized training than footwear impression evidence. This 
hypothesis was supported in that expert examiners performed significantly better than 
novice examiners, but only when analyzing fingerprint evidence and not footwear 
impression evidence. These findings suggest past research using forensic stimulus 
materials that require specialized training and recruiting untrained participant examiners 
(e.g., Dror et al., 2005) may be underestimating the accuracy of forensic examiners in the 
field and future research should only use undergraduate student samples if the stimulus 
material being analyzed has been extensively pilot-tested and does not require on-the-job 
specialized training (e.g., footwear impression evidence). In addition, an interaction 
between examiner experience and stimulus material on participants’ response bias was 
found such that experts were more likely to make a “match” decision when analyzing 
fingerprint evidence compared to novices. Interestingly however, expert examiners were 
more likely to make a “non-match” decision when analyzing footwear impressions 
compared to novices. It appears that differences in fingerprint analyses experience 
between our expert and novice participants led to differences in reporting tendencies. It 
may be that although footwear impression analyses requires less specialized training than 
fingerprint analyses and both are a form of pattern analyses, simply being trained in one 
does not make you proficient in the analyses of the other and may in fact hinder your 
abilities to analyze other forms of evidence. As such, future work should more finely 
examine the similarities and differences between forensic evidence trainings and 
investigate how these differences affect examiners’ judgments across a variety of forensic 
domains.    
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Stimulus Material 
The third and final aim of the present study was to investigate the effect of 
contextual bias on examiners’ evaluation of fingerprint and footwear impression 
evidence, with fingerprint examination requiring significantly more expertise and training 
than footwear impression analyses (International Association for Identification, 2018; 
Sirchie, 2018). It was hypothesized that contextual bias would have an effect on 
examiners’ judgments when the evidence being analyzed required significantly more 
specialized training (fingerprints). However, present findings did not support the 
interaction between contextual bias and evidence type. Regardless of whether examiners 
were provided with a blind, non-blind or partially redacted LAR there were no 
differences in examiners’ performance when analyzing fingerprint evidence. 
The present findings do not suggest fingerprint evidence analyses are particularly 
susceptible to the effects of contextual information compared to analyses of footwear 
impression evidence, which is at odds with the general belief that evidence difficulty and 
ambiguity moderate the effect of contextual bias (Dror et al., 2005). However, it is 
important to note that not all past research has found a moderating effect of evidence 
difficulty and ambiguity (with ambiguous materials being more difficult to analyze) 
(Kerstholt, et al., 2007). That is, some research has failed to find an effect of contextual 
information even with particularly difficult analyses. For example, Kerstholt and 
colleagues (2007) did not find an effect of bias on footwear impression analyses even 
when the footwear impressions were made to be ambiguous. It was initially hypothesized 
that these discrepant results from past research were due to differences in the evidence 
material used such that Dror and colleagues (2005) used fingerprints while Kerstholt and 
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colleagues (2007) used footwear impressions. Surprisingly, our results did not provide 
support for this hypothesis.  
We can only speculate as to why contextual information did not have an effect on 
neither examiners’ fingerprint nor footwear impression analyses. Contextual information 
may not have influenced examiners’ analyses when judging footwear impression 
evidence because the footwear impression pairs presented to participants were of 
comparable difficulty to the fingerprint pairs. For example, on average, the difficulty 
rating of the footwear impression stimuli used for the current study was 2.56, and the 
average difficulty for the fingerprint stimuli was 4.06 (rated on a scale from 1 being not 
at all difficult to 7 being extremely difficult). It is possible that if fingerprints with a 
higher difficulty level (i.e., had been selected from the ‘insufficient to difficult’ category) 
and footwear impressions from the ‘moderate to easy’ category had been chosen, an 
effect of contextual information would have been found for fingerprints and not footwear 
impressions. Nonetheless, discrepancies between current results and existing research 
warrant a more precise examination of how evidence type (e.g., evidence complexity, 
ambiguity, difficulty) plays a role in the relationship between contextual bias and 
examiners’ forensic analyses.  
Testing Linear Sequential Unmasking Procedures 
Exploratory analyses were also conducted to examine the effect of presenting 
participants with a non-blind LAR (regardless of the initial LAR they had received) and 
asking them whether they would like to change any of their initial judgments, mirroring 
recommended linear sequential unmasking procedures. Although only 100 participants 
decided to go back to their original responses, 17% of those who decided to change at 
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least one of their Time 1 judgments made a correct change. However, 14% of participants 
who decided to go back to their Time 1 judgments made an incorrect change. It appears 
that the linear sequential unmasking procedure may result in both increases in correct and 
incorrect changes at Time 2.  However, only novice examiners actually made changes at 
their Time 2 judgments, whereas no expert examiners did, questioning further the actual 
usefulness of the proposed procedure and also the usefulness of even providing the task-
relevant information in the first place.  
It is important to note however that because the present study is the first to 
experimentally examine the linear sequential unmasking procedure, it provided a very 
simplified manner in which additional case details were sequentially presented to 
examiners. Specifically, examiners who were initially given a blind or partially-redacted 
LAR later received all case details that were previously unavailable all at once in the 
second LAR and not one detail at a time. It may be that presenting examiners with one 
detail at a time, may result in fewer errors. Future research should investigate 
systematically how the level of bias and importance in any additional detail affect the 
potential for bias.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 The current study sought to examine differences between experts and novices and 
in doing so required study methods to be employed easily to practitioners in the field. 
Thus, the study was distributed using Qualtrics survey system, which - similar to past 
research in the field - did not allow for the implementation of tools commonly used by 
practitioners to analyze forensic fingerprint evidence (e.g., CSIpix and PiAnoS). In order 
to address this limitation, only ‘moderate to easy’ difficulty level fingerprint comparisons 
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were presented to examiners. Considering fingerprint stimuli chosen for the current study 
were rated by experts to be relatively “easy” comparisons – unlike any other prior study - 
the degree to which bias could have impacted examiners’ judgments may have been 
reduced. However, undergraduate students rated the same fingerprints as being more 
difficult, yet an effect of bias was still not found. Nonetheless, future research should aim 
at using more difficult stimuli and allow examiners to use the programs and analysis 
software commonly found in the field. Additionally, due to the extreme difficulty in 
recruiting expert examiners, the current study may be underpowered as only 55 expert 
examiners participated versus 287 novice examiners. Thus, there is the possibility that an 
interaction between examiner experience and contextual bias may still be found if 
additional expert examiners were to be recruited. Nonetheless, the current study’s sample 
is significantly larger than previous studies that have also aimed to recruit experts in the 
field (Dror & Charlton, 2006; Dror, Charlton & Peron 2005) and provides a positive 
outlook for future research. Future research should continue to engage in collaborative 
research processes that involve practitioners in order to build trusting relationships, which 
subsequently results in more practitioners agreeing to participate in research.   
 Another potential limitation of the current study is that examiners were presented 
only with an LAR and no other case materials. Forensic examiners are sometimes 
provided with additional materials such as witness statements, pathology reports and 
other types of contextual information, which were not used in the current study. 
Nonetheless, the current study improves upon previous research such that examiners were 
presented with an evidence submission form that mirrors those frequently found in the 
field and used by forensic labs across the United States (Gardener et al., 2019) instead of 
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a case summary in the form of a written paragraph, which is unlikely to mirror actual lab 
practices. Future research should continue to expand on the generalizability of materials 
used in experimental research by providing examiners with additional case materials that 
are commonly provided to forensic examiners.  
 Furthermore, research examining the effects of contextual bias and testing the 
efficacy of proposed procedures used to reduce the effect of bias should move beyond 
basic laboratory paradigms and into field settings. Although it is difficult to maintain the 
same experimental control found in laboratory studies, it is crucial to test contextual 
information management procedures (e.g., context-manager method) with practitioners in 
order to properly understand how they can be implemented in a forensic laboratory’s 
standard operating procedures without disrupting the existing workflow. In addition, 
testing bias-reducing procedures in the field allows researchers and practitioners to 
determine what additional resources, if any, are necessary to successfully implement such 
procedures. For example, Found and Ganas (2013) tested a contextual information 
management procedure in a field setting and were able to determine that no additional 
personnel, time, or money was necessary to implement such a procedure for a laboratory-
based bloodstain pattern analysis. However, additional field studies, developed in 
collaboration with forensic experts must be conducted to discover if these same 
promising findings carry over to other forensic domains such as fingerprints, firearms, 
and DNA analyses.  
Implications and Conclusions 
Cognitive bias, specifically contextual bias, has become a primary area of concern 
within the forensic sciences due to high profile exoneration cases highlighting the 
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detrimental effects that having details about a case can have on a forensic examiner’s 
analyses (Innocence Project, 2017; National Academy of Sciences, 2009). Fortunately, 
researchers have proposed several solutions to decrease the negative effects of contextual 
bias such as the use of blind testing and redacting task-irrelevant information from case 
reports, both of which were examined in the current study (Kassin et al., 2013; Mattijssen 
et al., 2016). Although an effect of contextual information was not found, present 
findings still provide a promising outlook for the use of bias reducing procedures. That is, 
examiners often express concern about the use of such bias reducing procedures because 
it limits the amount of information they receive, which they believe may hinder their 
ability to accurately analyze forensic evidence. However, current results suggest there 
were no differences in examiners’ overall accuracy and discrimination accuracy rates 
suggesting that regardless of whether an examiner has all case details, no case details, or 
only task-relevant case details, an examiner is able to maintain the same level of 
accuracy.  
The present study also sought to address another common critique made by 
forensic examiners in the field regarding past research - having untrained undergraduate 
students analyze complex pieces of forensic evidence. By directly comparing expert and 
novice examiners’ performance in analyzing two types of forensic evidence that differ in 
level of difficulty (i.e., fingerprint and footwear impression evidence), the current study 
was able to confirm the importance of using stimuli materials that require less specialized 
training when using untrained examiners in research. Expert examiners were found to be 
significantly more accurate than novice examiners. However, expert examiners were only 
significantly more accurate and better able to discriminate between matching and non-
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matching pairs of evidence when analyzing fingerprint evidence and not footwear 
impression evidence. Thus, previous research using inexperienced student examiners 
must be interpreted with caution; especially when such novice examiners are asked to 
analyze evidence that requires a significant amount of training, such as fingerprints. 
To summarize, the present work provides promising results for the use of several 
bias-reducing methods. In legal proceedings, using blind testing and other contextual 
information management procedures, such as redacting task-irrelevant information, allow 
forensic expert witnesses to demonstrate to the court that proper steps were taken to 
reduce the potential for bias in their analyses. In addition, findings of the current study 
provide an important insight as to what occurs when undergraduate students versus 
trained forensic examiners are asked to analyze complex pieces of forensic evidence.  
Mainly, researchers should take careful consideration and work closely with actual 
forensic experts when developing stimulus materials and deciding what type of 
participant sample to use when conducting psychological research within forensic science 
domains.  
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Table 1.  
Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on 
Likelihood of Making a Correct Fingerprint ID 
 
Time 1 Judgment 
 
B 
 
SE 
 
  p 
 
Exp 
(B) 
 
95% CI for 
Exp(B) 
 
Correct Fingerprint ID 
 
     
   Experience 2.50 0.61 .000* 12.15 
 
3.70 - 39.90 
   Blindr v. partially redacted -0.38 0.29 .195 0.69 
 
0.39 - 1.21 
   Blindr v. non-blind 0.02 0.29 .948 1.02 
 
0.57 - 1.81 
   Partially redactedr v. non-blind  0.40 0.27 .166 1.49 
 
0.85 - 2.60 
   Contextual information x experience 0.29 0.74 .693 1.34 0.32 - 5.67 
      
Note.  r = reference group. 
          * = significant. 
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Table 2.  
Time 1 Judgments by Examiner Experience. 
Time 1  
Judgments 
Examiner 
Experience 
Frequency Percentage M (SD) 
 
Fingerprint 
Correct ID 
 
 
Expert 
 
52 
 
94.5% 
 
0.95 (0.23) 
Novice 170 59.2% 0.59 (0.49) 
Footwear 
Impression Correct 
ID 
 
Expert 42 76.4% 0.76 (0.43) 
Novice 274 95.5% 0.95 (0.21) 
Incorrect 
Fingerprint 
Exclusion 
 
Expert 1 1.8% 0.02 (0.13) 
Novice 68 23.7% 0.23 (0.43) 
Incorrect Footwear 
Impression 
Exclusion 
 
Expert 1 1.8% 0.02 (0.13) 
Novice 9 3.1% 0.03 (0.17) 
Correct 
Fingerprint 
Exclusion 
 
Expert 52 94.5% 0.95 (0.23) 
Novice 158 55.1% 0.55 (0.50) 
Correct Footwear 
Impression 
Exclusion 
 
Expert 27 49.1% 0.49 (0.50) 
Novice 135 47% 0.47 (0.50) 
False Fingerprint 
ID 
 
Expert 0 0% 0.00 (0.00) 
Novice 16 5.6% 0.06 (0.23) 
False Footwear 
Impression 
Exclusion 
Expert 1 1.8% 0.02 (0.13) 
Novice 70 24.4% 0.24 (0.43) 
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Table 3.  
Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on 
Likelihood of Making a Correct Footwear Impression ID 
 
Time 1 Judgment 
 
B 
 
SE 
 
  p 
 
Exp 
(B) 
 
95% CI for 
Exp(B) 
 
Correct Footwear Impression ID 
 
     
   Experience -1.89 0.43 .000* 0.15 
 
0.07 - 0.35 
   Blindr v. partially redacted 0.40 0.54 .459 1.49 
 
0.52 - 4.32 
   Blindr v. non-blind 0.04 0.50 .933 1.04 
 
0.39 - 2.78 
   Partially redactedr v. non-blind  -0.36 0.53 .498 0.70 
 
0.25 - 1.97 
   Contextual information x experience 0.74 0.56 .187 2.10 0.70 - 6.31 
      
Note.  r = reference group. 
          * = significant. 
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Table 4.  
Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on 
Likelihood of Making an Incorrect Fingerprint Exclusion 
 
Time 1 Judgment 
 
B 
 
SE 
 
  p 
 
Exp 
(B) 
 
95% CI for 
Exp(B) 
 
Incorrect Fingerprint Exclusion 
 
     
   Experience -2.82 1.02 .006* 0.06 
 
0.01 - 0.44 
   Blindr v. partially redacted 0.03 0.34 .940 1.03 
 
0.53 - 1.98 
   Blindr v. non-blind -0.14 0.34 .677 0.87 
 
0.45 - 1.69 
   Partially redactedr v. non-blind  -0.17 0.34 .620 0.85 
 
0.44 - 1.64 
   Contextual information x experience -0.10 1.25 .935 0.90 0.08 - 10.37 
      
Note.  r = reference group. 
          * = significant. 
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Table 5.  
Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on 
Likelihood of Making an Incorrect Footwear Impression Exclusion 
 
Time 1 Judgment 
 
B 
 
SE 
 
  p 
 
Exp 
(B) 
 
95% CI for 
Exp(B) 
 
Incorrect Footwear Impression 
Exclusion 
 
     
   Experience -0.56 1.07 .598 0.57 
 
0.07 - 4.61 
   Blindr v. partially redacted 0.49 0.74 .508 1.64 
 
0.38 - 7.03 
   Blindr v. non-blind -0.50 0.92 .592 0.61 
 
0.10 - 3.72 
   Partially redactedr v. non-blind  -0.99 0.85 .244 0.37 
 
0.07 - 1.96 
   Contextual information x experience 1.38 0.03 .997 0.90 0.00 - 0.01 
      
Note.  r = reference group. 
          * = significant. 
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Table 6.  
Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on 
Likelihood of Making a Correct Fingerprint Exclusion 
 
Time 1 Judgment 
 
B 
 
SE 
 
  p 
 
Exp 
(B) 
 
95% CI for 
Exp(B) 
 
Correct Fingerprint Exclusion 
 
     
   Experience 2.65 0.61 .000* 14.19 
 
4.33 - 46.55 
   Blindr v. partially redacted 0.29 0.29 .311 1.34 
 
0.76 - 2.37 
   Blindr v. non-blind -0.29 0.29 .308 0.75 
 
0.43 - 1.31 
   Partially redactedr v. non-blind  -0.99 0.85 .244 0.37 
 
0.07 - 1.96 
   Contextual information x experience -0.06 0.78 .940 0.94 0.21 - 4.33 
      
Note.  r = reference group. 
          * = significant. 
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Table 7.  
Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on 
Likelihood of Making a Correct Footwear Impression Exclusion 
 
Time 1 Judgment 
 
B 
 
SE 
 
  p 
 
Exp 
(B) 
 
95% CI for 
Exp(B) 
 
Correct Footwear Impression 
Exclusion 
 
     
   Experience 0.08 0.30 .778 1.09 
 
0.61 - 1.94 
   Blindr v. partially redacted 0.02 0.27 .941 1.02 
 
0.60 - 1.73 
   Blindr v. non-blind -0.06 0.27 .817 0.94 
 
0.56 - 1.58 
   Partially redactedr v. non-blind  -0.08 0.26 .756 0.92 
 
0.55 - 1.54 
   Contextual information x experience -0.78 0.39  .043* 0.46 0.22 - 0.98 
      
Note.  r = reference group. 
          * = significant. 
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Table 8.  
Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on 
Likelihood of Making a False Fingerprint ID 
 
Time 1 Judgment 
 
B 
 
SE 
 
  p 
 
Exp 
(B) 
 
95% CI for 
Exp(B) 
 
False Fingerprint ID 
 
     
   Experience 18.36 5377.50 .997 0.00 
 
0.00 - -- 
   Blindr v. partially redacted -0.75 0.72 .300 0.47 
 
0.12 - 1.95 
   Blindr v. non-blind 0.10 0.03 .865 1.10 
 
0.36 - 3.41 
   Partially redactedr v. non-blind  0.85 0.71 .230 2.33 
 
0.59 - 9.30 
   Contextual information x experience 0.39 7496.57 1.00 1.48 0.00 - -- 
      
Note.  r = reference group. 
          * = significant. 
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Table 9.  
Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on 
Likelihood of Making a False Footwear Impression ID 
 
Time 1 Judgment 
 
B 
 
SE 
 
  p 
 
Exp 
(B) 
 
95% CI for 
Exp(B) 
 
False Footwear Impression ID 
 
     
   Experience -2.87 1.02 .005* 0.06 
 
0.01 - 0.42 
   Blindr v. partially redacted 0.03 0.35 .931 1.03 
 
0.53 - 2.03 
   Blindr v. non-blind 0.30 0.33 .373 1.35 
 
0.70 - 2.58 
   Partially redactedr v. non-blind  0.27 0.33 .418 1.31 
 
0.69 - 2.48 
   Contextual information x experience -0.10 1.35 .938 0.90 0.06 - 12.64 
      
Note.  r = reference group. 
          * = significant.  
97 
 
Table 10.  
Mixed ANOVA Analysis Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on Total Number of 
Inconclusive Judgments Made 
 
Predictor 
 
M 
 
 
SE 
 
 
F 
 
 
p 
 
 
𝜂𝑝
2 
 
 
Contextual Information 
   
0.03 
 
.973 
 
.000 
      
     Blind  
 
 
0.41 
 
0.06 
   
     Non-blind 
 
0.43 0.05    
     Partially redacted 
 
0.41 0.05    
 
Examiner Experience 
 
 
 
  
0.33 
 
.569 
 
.001 
     Expert 0.40 0.05    
      
     Novice 
 
 
0.43 
 
0.02 
   
 
Stimulus Material 
 
 
  
9.50 
 
.002* 
 
.027 
      
     Fingerprints 
 
0.33 
 
0.04 
   
      
     Footwear impressions 
 
 
0.50 
 
0.04 
   
 
Stimulus Pair 
   
48.73 
 
.000* 
 
.127 
      
     Match 
 
0.22 0.03    
     Non-match 0.61 0.05    
      
Note. * = significant. 
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Table 11.  
Mixed ANOVA Analysis Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on Accuracy Rate 
 
Predictor 
 
M 
 
 
SE 
 
 
F 
 
 
p 
 
 
𝜂𝑝
2 
 
 
Contextual Information 
   
0.16 
 
.856 
 
.001 
      
     Blind  
 
 
0.73 
 
0.03 
   
     Non-blind 
 
0.70 0.03    
     Partially redacted 
 
0.72 0.03    
 
Examiner Experience 
 
 
 
  
20.82 
 
.000* 
 
.058 
     Expert 0.79 0.03    
      
     Novice 
 
 
0.64 
 
0.01 
   
 
Stimulus Material 
 
 
  
6.94 
 
.009* 
 
.020 
      
     Fingerprints 
 
0.76 
 
0.03 
   
      
     Footwear impressions 
 
 
0.67 
 
0.02 
   
 
Stimulus Pair 
   
35.28 
 
.000* 
 
.095 
      
     Match 
 
 
0.81 
 
0.02 
   
     Non-match 0.61 0.03    
      
Note. * = significant.  
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Table 12.  
Mixed ANOVA Analysis Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on Discrimination 
Accuracy  
 
Predictor 
 
M 
 
 
SE 
 
 
F 
 
 
p 
 
 
𝜂𝑝
2 
 
 
Contextual Information 
   
1.07 
 
.344 
 
.006 
      
     Blind  
 
 
0.10 
 
0.13 
   
     Non-blind 
 
0.04 0.12    
     Partially redacted 
 
0.28 0.12    
 
Examiner Experience 
 
 
 
  
8.14 
 
.005* 
 
.024 
     Expert 0.34 0.06    
      
     Novice 
 
 
-0.06 
 
0.13 
   
 
Stimulus Material 
 
 
  
7.59 
 
.006* 
 
.022 
      
     Fingerprints 
 
0.34 
 
0.11 
   
      
     Footwear impressions 
 
-0.67 
 
0.10 
   
      
Note. * = significant.  
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Table 13.  
Mixed ANOVA Analysis Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on Response Bias 
 
Predictor 
 
M 
 
 
SE 
 
 
F 
 
 
p 
 
 
𝜂𝑝
2 
 
 
Contextual Information 
   
0.16 
 
.855 
 
.001 
      
     Blind  
 
 
0.10 
 
0.07 
   
     Non-blind 
 
0.07 0.07    
     Partially redacted 
 
0.05 0.07    
 
Examiner Experience 
 
 
 
  
7.30 
 
.007* 
 
.021 
     Expert 0.18 0.07    
      
     Novice 
 
 
-0.03 
 
0.03 
   
 
Stimulus Material 
 
 
  
19.55 
 
.000* 
 
.055 
      
     Fingerprints 
 
-0.08 
 
0.05 
   
      
     Footwear impressions 
 
0.23 
 
0.05 
   
      
Note. * = significant.  
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Table 14.  
Mixed ANOVA Analysis Examining Effects of Predictor Variables on Confidence Ratings 
 
Predictor 
 
M 
 
 
SE 
 
 
F 
 
 
p 
 
 
𝜂𝑝
2 
 
 
Contextual Information 
   
0.76 
 
.469 
 
.005 
      
     Blind  
 
 
5.64 
 
0.13 
   
     Non-blind 
 
5.65 0.11    
     Partially redacted 
 
5.47 0.12    
 
Examiner Experience 
 
 
 
  
5.35 
 
.021* 
 
.016 
     Expert 5.75 0.13    
      
     Novice 
 
 
5.43 
 
0.06 
   
 
Stimulus Material 
 
 
  
16.15 
 
.000* 
 
.046 
      
     Fingerprints 
 
5.78 
 
0.09 
   
      
     Footwear impressions 
 
 
5.40 
 
0.08 
   
 
Stimulus Pair 
   
27.17 
 
.000* 
 
.075 
      
     Match 
 
 
2.90 
 
0.04 
   
     Non-match 2.69 0.04    
      
Note. * = significant.  
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Table 15.  
Confidence and Accuracy Bivariate Correlation by Predictor Variables   
 
Condition 
 
r 
 
p 
Contextual Information   
     Blind LAR .088 .364 
     Non-blind LAR .246 .007* 
     Redacted LAR .093 .322 
Examiner Experience   
     Experts .200 .143 
     Novices  .114 .053 
Stimulus Material   
     Fingerprint  .214 .000* 
   
     Footwear impression .210 .000* 
   
Stimulus Pair   
   
     Match  .200 .000* 
   
     Non-match  .219 .000* 
Note.  * = significant. 
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Table 16. 
Ordinal Logistic Regression Analyses Examining Effects of Contextual Information and 
Examiner Experience on Likelihood of Reviewing Time 1 Judgments  
 
Time 1 Judgment 
 
B 
 
SE 
 
  p 
 
Exp 
(B) 
 
95% CI for 
Exp(B) 
 
Correct Fingerprint ID 
 
     
   Experience 2.50 0.61 .000* 12.15 
 
3.70 - 39.90 
   Blindr v. partially redacted -0.38 0.29 .195 0.69 
 
0.39 - 1.21 
   Blindr v. non-blind 0.02 0.29 .948 1.02 
 
0.57 - 1.81 
   Partially redactedr v. non-blind  0.40 0.27 .166 1.49 
 
0.85 - 2.60 
   Contextual information x experience 0.29 0.74 .693 1.34 0.32 - 5.67 
      
Note.  r = reference group. 
          * = significant. 
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Figure 1. Student Match Fingerprint Judgements 
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Figure 2. Student Non-Match Fingerprint Judgements 
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Figure 3. Average Number of Inconclusive Judgments by Examiner Experience and 
Stimulus Material.  
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Figure 4. Average Accuracy Rate by Examiner Experience and Evidence Material   
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Figure 5. Average Discrimination Accuracy by Examiner Experience and Evidence 
Material 
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Figure 6. Average Confidence Ratings by Examiner Experience and Evidence Material 
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Appendix A 
Miami-Dade Police Department Lab Analysis Request Form 
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Appendix B 
Blind Condition Lab Analysis Request Form 
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Appendix C 
Non-Blind Condition Lab Analysis Request Form 
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Appendix D 
 Partially Redacted Condition Lab Analysis Request Form  
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Appendix E 
Critical Pieces of Information on Non-Blind and Partially Redacted Condition Lab 
Analysis Request Forms 
1. Two subjects forced entry to car 
a. Needs to be known for collection and examination purposes. Examiners 
need to know that more than one subject entered the car because if they 
are not given this information, then they may believe that they can stop 
analyzing the evidence after they analyze the first pair of prints. If there is 
more than one subject, then examiners are aware that more evidence needs 
to be analyzed and tested.  
2. A lighter was found 
a. Needs to be known for examination purposes. Examiners need to know 
that a lighter was found at the crime scene and thus needs to be analyzed 
for prints and DNA.  
3. Latent lifts were collected from inside of car 
a. Needs to be known for examination and database entry purposes. 
Examiners need to know where the fingerprints were lifted from. If they 
were collected from inside the care, then the examiner knowns that it can 
be either from the victim, either one of the subjects who entered the car, or 
any other person who has been inside the vehicle. Also, in order for the 
evidence to be entered into certain databases (e.g., AFIS) items must be 
directly associated to the crime and so knowing that the prints were lifted 
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form inside of the car and the subjects forced entry into the car, then the 
prints become associated with the crime.   
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Appendix F 
Lab Analysis Request Form Questionnaire 
Please answer the following open-ended and multiple-choice questions regarding the lab 
analysis request form you were given. 
1. Please write down everything you remember about the information provided in 
the lab request form. 
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. What type of case summary did you receive as part of the Lab Analysis Request 
Form? 
a. Complete case summary 
b. Partially redacted (i.e., blacked-out) case summary 
c. No case summary (routine) 
 
3. How many fingerprint pairs were you asked to analyze? 
a. 1 pair of fingerprints 
b. 2 pairs of fingerprints 
c. 3 pairs of fingerprints 
d. I don’t know 
 
4. How many footwear impression pairs were you asked to analyze? 
a. 1 pair of footwear impressions 
b. 2 pairs of footwear impressions 
c. 3 pairs of footwear impressions 
d. I don’t know 
 
5. What type of crime occurred? 
a. Attempted murder 
b. Attempted strong armed robbery 
c. Carjacking 
d. Information not given 
e. I don’t know 
 
6. How many suspects were involved? 
a. 1 suspect 
b. 2 suspects 
c. 3 suspects 
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d. Information not given 
e. I don’t know 
 
7. How many victims were involved? 
a. 1 victim 
b. 2 victims 
c. 3 victims 
d. Information not given 
e. I don’t know 
 
8. What evidence was submitted to the crime lab? 
a. A gun 
b. A lighter 
c. A hat 
d. Information not given 
e. I don’t know 
  
9. Where were fingerprints lifted from the car? 
a. Steering wheel  
b. Passenger door window 
c. Trunk of the car 
d. Information not given 
e. I don’t know 
 
10. Where was the victim coming from? 
a. She was leaving work 
b. She was leaving school 
c. She was leaving a concert 
d. Information not given 
e. I don’t know 
 
11. Where did the crime take place? 
a. At a hotel parking lot 
b. Near a supermarket 
c. On a school campus 
d. Information not given 
e. I don’t know 
 
12. What did the suspects demand from the victim? 
a. Her purse and jewelry 
b. Her cellphone  
c. Nothing 
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d. Information not given 
e. I don’t know 
 
13. What weapon was used? 
a. A gun 
b. A knife 
c. There was no weapon 
d. Information not given 
e. I don’t know 
 
14. What item was taken from the victim? 
a. A cellphone 
b. A purse 
c. Nothing 
d. Information not given 
e. I don’t know 
 
15. Who dropped an item? 
a. Subject #1 
b. Subject #2 
c. The victim 
d. Information not given 
e. I don’t know 
 
16. Where was the car parked? 
a. In a parking garage 
b. On a dirt lot 
c. At a meter 
d. Information not given 
e. I don’t know 
 
17. How many suspects were in custody? 
a. None 
b. Only one 
c. Both 
d. Information not given 
e. I don’t know 
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Appendix G 
Perceptions Questionnaire 
1. Across all judgments you made, how accurate do you think you were? 
 
0% (not at all accurate) – 100% (extremely accurate) 
 
2. How guilty do you think suspect #1, Erick Rodriguez is? 
 
1 (definitely innocent) – 10 (definitely guilty) 
 
3. How guilty do you think suspect #2, Michael English is? 
 
1 (definitely innocent) – 10 (definitely guilty) 
For participants in non-blind condition:  
1. Do you feel that sufficient information was provided in the lab analysis request 
forms to make accurate judgements? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
If not, why? ____________ 
2. Do you feel that your analyses were biased because you had information about the 
case? 
c. Yes 
d. No 
 
3. Which type of lab request form would you prefer to have when analyzing forensic 
evidence? 
e. A lab analysis request form with all the possible case information 
f. A lab analysis request form with all irrelevant case information redacted 
g. A lab analysis request form with no case information 
For participants in partially redacted condition: 
1. Did you feel that sufficient information was provided in the first lab analysis 
request form to make accurate decisions about the forensic evidence? 
h. Yes 
i. No 
If not, why? ____________ 
2. Did you feel more comfortable in your decision after receiving all the information 
about the case in your second lab request form?  
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j. Yes 
k. No 
 
3. Do you feel that you may have been unduly influenced if provided with the 
redacted information (blacked-out) in your first lab request form? 
l. Yes 
m. No 
 
4. Which type of lab request form would you prefer to have when analyzing forensic 
evidence? 
n. A lab analysis request form with all possible case information 
o. A lab analysis request form with all irrelevant case information redacted 
p. A lab analysis request form with no case information 
For those who had a case summary with no information: 
1. Did you feel that sufficient information was provided in the first lab analysis 
request form to make accurate decisions about the forensic evidence? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
If not, why? ____________ 
2. Did you feel more comfortable in your decision after receiving all the information 
about the case in your second lab request form?  
a. Yes 
b. No 
 
3. What was your interpretation of the word “Routine” found in the first lab request 
form?  
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Do you feel that you may have been unduly influenced if provided with case 
information in your first lab request form? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
5. Which type of lab request form would you prefer to have when analyzing forensic 
evidence? 
a. A lab analysis request form with all possible case information 
b. A lab analysis request form with irrelevant case information redacted 
c. A lab analysis request form with no case information 
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Appendix H 
Demographics Questionnaire 
1. What is your age? _______ 
2. What is your gender? 
a. Male 
b. Female 
3. What is your ethnicity 
a. Caucasian 
b. Hispanic or Latino 
c. Black or African American 
d. Asian or Pacific Islander 
e. Native American or American Indian 
f. Other (Please Specify: _______________) 
4. What is your highest level of education? 
a. High school degree 
b. Associates Degree 
c. Bachelors’ Degree 
d. Master’s Degree 
e. Doctoral Degree 
f. Other (Please Specify: _______________) 
5. What is your occupation? _______________ 
6. Have you had any experience analyzing forensic evidence? 
a. No 
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b. Yes 
i. If yes, please briefly explain your experience below: 
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________
______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________ 
 
7. Please select one of the following: 
a. I am an undergraduate student at FIU 
b. I am a trained forensic examiner (or have experience analyzing forensic 
evidence) 
The following questions will be asked only to expert forensic examiners. 
8. How many years of active casework experience have you completed? 
_______________ 
9. Are you employed by a law enforcement agency? 
a. No 
i. If no, please explain 
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
b. Yes 
i. If yes, what type of Law Enforcement Agency are you employed 
by? 
1. Local 
2. State 
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3. Federal 
10. Are latent print examinations your primary duty? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
11. Do you examine other types of evidence in addition to latent fingerprints? 
a. No 
b. Yes (If yes, please specify: _______________________________) 
12. Are you an IAI certified latent print examiner? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Does not apply 
13. Do you usually apply ACE-V methodology in latent print examinations? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Does not apply 
14. Have you completed any structured latent fingerprint training program? 
a. Yes 
i. If yes, how long was the training program? 
1. 0 to 1 years 
2. 1 to 2 years 
3. More than 2 years 
ii. If yes, how long ago did you complete this training? 
1. Less than a year ago 
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2. Between 1 to 2 years ago 
3. More than 2 years ago 
iii. If yes, please describe the type of structured fingerprint training 
you have completed.  
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________
____ 
 
b. No 
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